INTRODUCTION
Why
should there be a discipline such as epistemology? Aristotle (384–322 BC)
provided the answer when he said that philosophy begins in a kind of wonder or
puzzlement. Nearly all human beings wish to comprehend the world they live in,
and many of them construct theories of various kinds to help them make sense of
it. Because many aspects of the world defy easy explanation, however, most
people are likely to cease their efforts at some point and to content
themselves with whatever degree of understanding and knowledge they have
managed to achieve[1].
Epistemology
is the branch of philosophy that is easily identified with the critical and
systematic analysis of knowledge and its related concepts. It is often referred
to as the theory of knowledge. Epistemology involves the question of knowledge,
evidence and justification. The term knowledge can be used in different senses,
but here in this paper I am concern with the philosophical meaning and
implications of the term ‘knowledge’ as the subject matter of epistemology.
Traditionally, knowledge means a justified true belief. Justification is the
degree to which knowledge is asserted to be certain. Justification is providing
evidence(s) for the affirmation of our knowledge claim.
Epistemology
has a long history, beginning from the ancient Greeks and continuing in the
present. Throughout its very long history, epistemology has pursued two
different sorts of task: description and justification. The two tasks of
description and justification are not inconsistent because they are very
essential to the works of epistemology as a philosophical discipline. In its
descriptive task, epistemology aims to depict accurately certain features of
the world, including the contents of the human mind, and to determine what
kinds of mental content, if any, ought to count as knowledge.[2]
Lately, there is a challenge and a question mark on knowledge as a justified
true belief, following the inception of the Gettier’s problem of knowledge.
There are equally challenges on the reliability of epistemology as a theory of
knowledge because of the skeptists debates that there is no knowledge or it is
not attainable.
Given
the central role of epistemology, debates over the analysis of knowledge,
sources of knowledge, and the status of skepticism will alone keep the
discipline of epistemology active and productive. The nature of this paper is
tripartite; it has to do with the issues of knowledge, its justification and
the challenges of skepticism. As I advance to the main concern of the work, it
is important that I clarify, giving definition of the terms I will use and the
sense in which they are to be understood with regards to this paper work.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
It
is appropriate to make a conceptual clarification of the terms as they are used
on this paper since the terms that relates to this paper can be used in more
than a sense of understanding. The major terms used in this work are:
knowledge, justification and skepticism.
THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE
One
of the basic questions of epistemology concerns the nature of knowledge. The
concept of knowledge is problematic in the sense that it implies a number of
possible meanings. The knowledge question, requests for the conditions under
which one can be said to have attained certitude about a thing propositionally.
Traditionally, knowledge is a justified true belief. The traditional analyses
of knowledge suggest that knowledge is true conviction coupled with good enough
reason supporting the conviction. Knowledge is what some philosophers call
factive state. Trying to explain knowledge with reference to epistemic
justification I need an account of the critical epistemic concept in terms of
which I am saying something interesting about knowledge and this account must
thus presuppose an understanding of knowledge.
SOURCE OS KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge
as an acquisition comes from a number of sources. Knowledge does not come from
the blue sky, there are sources through which one can acquire knowledge, which
includes: sense experience, reason etc. the senses provides us with empirical
knowledge, knowledge with regards to the physical realm of reality, the seen,
the felt, the perceived, the heard etc. while reason provides us with rational
knowledge, knowledge about things that are not necessarily perceived, a
knowledge that comes from the rigorous act of human thinking.
There
are sorts of knowledge which includes: knowledge by acquaintance, practical
knowledge and propositional knowledge. Knowledge by acquaintance connotes
familiarity. Practical knowledge has to do with “how to”, involving the
capability to do something. Propositional or factual knowledge implies knowing
what the case is. The two major sources of knowledge are rationalism and
empiricism. Knowledge being so vast has different ways to its understanding:
knowledge can be understood to mean an acquaintance, know-how, proposition and
a justified true belief. However for the sake of this paper, the concept of
knowledge here is referring to its meaning as an justified true belief.
KNOWLEDGE AS
JUTIFIED TRUE BELIEF AND CONDITIONS FOR
KNOWLEDGE
This is popularly referred to as the
tripartite definition of knowledge. It implies that three conditions are
individually necessary and jointly sufficient to ascertain what is referred to
as knowledge.[3]Justification
truth and belief are the traditional requirements to make a claim to knowledge.
With regards to this definition of knowledge, one is said to know only under
the conditions that his knowledge is true, he believes in the trueness of his
knowledge and his knowledge must pass rational justification. This analysis is
commonly referred to as the “JTB account”. With regards to the conditions for
truth, it is overwhelmingly clear that what is false cannot be known. For
example, it is false that Fr. Francis Sohe is the author of Certitude and Doubt.
Since it is false, it is not the sort of thing anybody can know. With regards
to belief, for one to know, he has to believe first. Beliefs that are lacking
justification are false more often than not.
Knowledge
as justified true belief sustained injuries and damage with the advent of the
Gettier’s counter examples against it. Gettier questions the sufficiency of the
“JTB” account to making claims to knowledge. Gettier attacked the first
condition which is justification, thereby exposing the latter two to insufficiency.
He gave an example where there is justification and yet a reliable and correct
claim of knowledge could not be made. Gettier’s attack with his 1963 paper was
basically on the justification, but his counter example presented a justified
true belief that did not pass as knowledge and this puts a question mark on the
traditional definition of knowledge. This on the other hand exposes the
inadequacy of justified true belief to provide knowledge; knowledge requires
certainty. If we attempt an understanding of knowledge as a true conviction
supported by appropriate epistemic reasons or evidences that makes our belief
probable, then we should note that there are epistemic concepts more
fundamental than knowledge in terms of which knowledge should be understood.
Concepts like justification; the most interesting component of knowledge is the
justification.
JUSTIFICATION
The
concept of justification is the most fundamental to epistemology. The term
justification belongs to a cluster of normative terms which includes
reasonable, rational, and warranted. These terms are common to epistemology.
Justification here refers strictly to the epistemic sense of the word. Our
beliefs are the product of a complex casual process. The term justification is
used to evaluate certain aspects of this process. Since we think that
justification confers a reasonable high assurance, we won’t be too disconcerted
when deprived of knowledge, so long as our justification is not questioned.
What
does it mean to justify a belief? Justification is the degree to which
knowledge is asserted to be certain. Justification is providing evidence(s) for
the affirmation of our knowledge claim. It is the provision of rational
defensible theories that are synoptic, descriptively accurate and explanatorily
powerful for our knowledge claims. Without justification, knowledge is as good
as being impossible because true belief does not qualify to be knowledge; knowledge
requires evidence. We must provide justification for whatever we claim to know.
Historically, the two major accounts of epistemic justification are
foundationalism and coherentism.
THE REGRESS PROBLEM OF
JUSTIFICATION
This is the
problem of relying on one belief for the justification of another, and the
justifying belief relies on another belief for its justification and so on. In
justifying a belief, one has to appeal to another justified belief. This
implies two possibilities: is either that there are some basic beliefs that we can be justified for
holding, without justifying them on the
basis of any other belief, or else there is an infinite regress of justification for each justified belief. With
regards to this, there is no basic justification. Justification wanders to and
fro our network of beliefs, having no end. The impossibility of completing an
infinite chain of reasoning is said to support skepticism. Socrates however,
says “the only true wisdom is knowing you know nothing”.
SKEPTICISM
These
are philosophers who deny the possibility of knowledge; they claim that we
really have no knowledge. Skepticism is the view that there is no certitude in
knowledge, there can only be probable opinion. Skepticism developed with regard
to various disciplines in which people claimed to have knowledge. In general,
the term skepticism refers to a family of views, each of which denies that some
term of positive epistemic appraisal applies to our beliefs. All philosophical skepticism is
ultimately epistemological; that is, it is based on views about the scope and
validity of human knowledge. Skepticism with reference to history takes its
root in ancient Greek philosophy, starting with Pyrrho of Elis as the first
skeptical philosopher. Skepticism can be more or less radical, or
comprehensive, depending on the set of belief upon which it is directed. But it
can also vary with respect to the kind of doubt it casts. Skeptic questions
about the justifiability doubts our knowledge claim.[4]
Skepticism is very much differentiated from ordinary doubt.
THE CHALLENGES OF
SKEPTICISM:
The
philosophical problem of skepticism derives from what appears to be very strong
argument for skeptical conclusions, and since many philosophers are unwilling
to accept those conclusions, there is a problem concerning how to respond to the
arguments[5].
Philosophical
skepticism doubts our epistemic beliefs; it can be limited or universal. It is
universal skepticism when it directs its doubt to all knowledge claims. The
seriousness of the skeptical challenge is the justification for our effort,
because there is no need for justification if there isn’t any doubt. Skepticism
sets out to shatter the foundation and backgrounds of epistemic claim,
especially with a particular vigour to justification. The skeptical challenges
is more or less a threat to epistemology but philosophers are not taking it in
like terms, because the doctrines of skepticism shakes the foundation,
doctrines and theories of knowledge, giving less prominence to epistemology.
One
type of skepticism denies any form of knowledge about the external world. This
does not imply that with more evidences that we can attain knowledge. Rather it
implies that knowledge is not attainable. On the plausible assumption that
knowledge entails justified beliefs, skepticism concerning knowledge follows
skepticism concerning justified beliefs; the view that justified beliefs about
the external world is not attainable. The challenge of skepticism to
epistemology is clear and distinct from ordinary doubt. Limited skepticism
forwards its doubts to a particular portion of epistemology, but radical
skepticism directs its doubt to the whole business of epistemology, denying in
totality the possibility of any form of knowledge.
REACTIONS TO THE
SKEPTICAL CHALLENGES
Plato,
one of the pre-Socratic philosophers, was very critical of the relativism and
skepticism of the sophists and was convinced of the objectivity and
universality of knowledge. He believes in certainty and stability with regards
to knowledge. He made a distinction between two worlds, the world of form and
world of materiality. The object of knowledge according to Plato resides in the
world of form, which is regarded as the real world by him. This is because
things in the world of form are stable and unchanging. Thus, knowledge is acquired
through the reasoning process which takes man to the world of forms and
presents him with the true objects of knowledge. In an attempt to save
epistemology from the sword of skepticism, Plato defined knowledge as justified
true belief. This definition is regarded presently as the classical definition
of knowledge.
RESPONSES TO SKEPTICISM
AND THE REGRESS PROBLEM OF JUSTIFICATION
Skepticism
is an important source of motivation for epistemology. It has prompted
philosophers to seek for beliefs that are not subjected to doubt. These are
self- justifying beliefs. Many philosophers throughout the history of western
epistemology tried to refute the skeptic by arguing that we do possess some
knowledge. They argue that we have genuine knowledge by clarifying the defining
conditions and main sources of our knowledge and also by demonstrating that we
can, at least satisfy the conditions of knowledge with the cognitive resources
available to us.[6]
Many philosophers have rebutted the skeptical arguments by showing the
reasoning to be invalid and the premises unwarranted. It has no other tendency
than to show the acuteness of sophistry.
THEORETICAL RESPONSES
TO SKEPTICISM
FOUNDATIONALISM: this is a theory of justification, considered
as a response to the regress problem of justification. This theory holds that some
basic beliefs, who in themselves do not require justification, serve as
foundation to support other beliefs. These beliefs might be justified because they are
self-evident, infallible, or derive from reliable cognitive mechanisms.
Perception, memory, and a priori intuition are often considered to be possible
examples of basic beliefs. Foundationalism is based upon the principle that
these beliefs are infallible enough to be recognized as such in practice.
COHERENTISM: this is equally a response to the
regress problem. This is a rejection of the assumption that regress goes
according to a pattern of linear justification. This theory holds that
individual beliefs are justified based on their conformity; the way they holds
together with the rest belief system of which it is a part.
PARTICULAR RESPONSE TO SKEPTICISM
DESCARTES: Descartes is a rationalist. He started his response to
skepticism on a skeptic note. He started by doubting; his doubt was methodic.
Descartes doubted everything, but could not doubt the cogito. Viewing skeptical
argument as simply an epistemological tool, Descartes was able to extend its
scope to the very notion of a mind-independent reality. Descartes
believed that certain knowledge was possible and that modern science would one
day enable humans to become the masters of nature, he also thought that
Skepticism presented a legitimate challenge that needed an answer, one that
only he could provide.
Descartes realized so well that skeptical argument needs to
operate by internal demolition that in the Meditations he turned the tables on
the skeptics by means of the very same strategy (doubt). The truth of our own
existence as thinking beings is one that the skeptics cannot deny, except on
pain of contradiction. “Cogito, ergo sum” provides, moreover, the cornerstone
of an alternative conception of knowledge that the Meditations have as their
mission to develop.
The challenge
of Skepticism, as Descartes saw it, is vividly described in his meditations. He
considered the possibility that an “evil genius” with extraordinary powers has
deceived him to such an extent that all his beliefs are false. But it is not
possible, Descartes contended, that all his beliefs are false, for if he has
false beliefs, he is thinking, and if he is thinking, then he exists.
Therefore, his belief that he exists cannot be false, as long as he is thinking.
This line of argument is summarized in the formula cogito, ergo sum (“I think,
therefore I am”). Descartes distinguished two sources of knowledge: intuition
and deduction. Intuition is an unmediated mental “seeing,” or direct
apprehension. Descartes's intuition of his own thinking guarantees that his
belief that he is thinking is true. Although his formula might suggest that his
belief that he exists is guaranteed by deduction rather than intuition (because
it contains the term “therefore”), in the Objections and Replies (1642)
he states explicitly that the certainty of this belief also is based upon
intuition. If one could know only that one thinks and that one exists, human
knowledge would be depressingly meager. Accordingly, Descartes attempted to broaden
the limits of knowledge by proving to his own satisfaction that God exists;
that the standard for knowing something is having a “clear and distinct” idea
of it; that mind is more known easily than body; that the essence of matter is
extension; and, finally, that most of his former beliefs are true.[7]
Descartes's
argument to show that his knowledge extends beyond his own existence depends
upon the claim that whatever he perceives “clearly and distinctly” is true.
This claim in turn is supported by his proof of the existence of God, together
with the assertion that God, because he is not a deceiver, would not cause
Descartes to be deceived in what he clearly and distinctly perceives.
CONCLUSION
I
have been discussing knowledge very eclectically, opting or basing my
discussion on no particular account. In arguing the skeptics, we ought to focus
more on the justification principle and conditions. Knowledge need not to be
considered separately outside justification.
It is important not to misunderstand the justification
condition. What it requires for knowledge is not that the subject have engaged
in the activity of justifying the belief, or performed the act of showing (or
trying to show) that the belief is justified. Rather, what the justification
condition requires is merely that the belief that qualifies as knowledge has
the property of being justified. It can have that property even if the subject
has not in fact shown to anyone that the belief is justified. Consider an
ordinary person's belief that five and five is ten. Most people have never
attempted to justify this belief, and probably would be at a loss as to how to
go about justifying it.[8]
Descartes
does not wish to convert us to skepticism with his doubt, but to find a
satisfactory basis for our knowledge, a basis so certain that all the
extravagant suppositions brought by the skeptics cannot shake it. Descartes
started on a skeptic note, but his doubt is methodic.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.
Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia
Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite. Chicago: Encyclopædia
Britannica, 2012.
2.
Jimoh, Anselm K, Certitude and Doubt: A Study Guide in Epistemology, Ibadan, Oyo
state, Ebony books and Kreations. 2013.
3.
Ruth, Weintraub, the skeptical challenge, London and New york, Routledge. 1997.
4.
Edward Carig, The shorter Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, London and New
York, Routledge. 2005.
5.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/notes.html
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6.
Microsoft® Encarta® 2009 [DVD].
Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008.
KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION: THE
CHALLENGES OF SKEPTICISM
BY
MUOGBO MICHAEL I.
SS/PP/2368
A Term Paper submitted to the
Department of Philosophy, Seminary of Saints Peter and Paul, Bodija, Ibadan, in
affiliation with the University of Ibadan, in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the Award of the Bachelor of Arts Degree in philosophy (B.A.
HONS.).
TERM PAPER: knowledge and justification: the challenges of skepticism.
COURSE
ADVANCED EPISTEMOLOGY
COURSE CODE
SS/PHL/304
LECTURERS
DR. ANSELM JIMOH AND FR. FRANCIS
SOHE
DATE
JANUARY 2015
[1] “epistemology."
Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate
Reference Suite. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012.
[2]
ibid
[3]
Jimoh, Anselm K, Certitude and Doubt:
A Study Guide in Epistemology, (Ibadan, Oyo state, Ebony books and
Kreations, August 2013). Pg. 30
[4]
Ruth, Weintraub, the skeptical
challenge, (London and New york, Routledge, 1997). Pg. 1
[5]
Edward Carig, The shorter Routledge
encyclopedia of philosophy, (London and New York, Routledge, 2005). pg.
934
[6]
Jimoh, Anselm K, Certitude and Doubt:
A Study Guide in Epistemology, (Ibadan, Oyo state, Ebony books and
Kreations, August 2013). Pg.74
[7] "epistemology."
Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference
Suite. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012.
[8] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/notes.html
(1 of 6) [8/7/02 1:05:56 PM]
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