BERGSON’S NOTION OF TIME AND ITS
IMPLICATION FOR METAPHYSICS
BY
MUOGBO MICHAEL IZUCHUKWU
MATRIC NUMBER
SS/PP/2368
BEING AN ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY SS PETER AND PAUL MAJOR SEMINARY, BODIJA, IBADAN, IN
AFFFLIATION WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE BACHELOR OF ARTS DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY.
BODIJA, IBADAN
JUNE, 2016
CERTIFICATION
This
is to certify that this project titled: BERGSON’S
NOTION OF TIME AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR METAPHYSICS, submitted to the
Department of Philosophy, Seminary of Saints Peter and Paul Bodija, Ibadan, in
affiliation with the University of Ibadan for the award of Bachelor of Arts
Degree in Philosophy, is a record of original research carried out by MUOGBO MICHAEL IZUCHUKWU.
……………………. ………………………………
DATE SUPERVISOR
REV. FR. DR. ANSELM JIMOH
Lecturer, Department of Philosophy,
Seminary of Saints Peter and Paul,
Bodija, Ibadan.
DEDICATION
THIS WORK IS
DEDICATED TO OUR LADY OF GOOD STUDIES,
CHIDUBEM MUOGBO
AND
ALL WHO ARE TIME
CONSCIOUS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
With
a deep sense of gratitude for the successful completion of this project, I
appreciate and thank the Almighty God without whom I can do nothing. I thank
Our Lady of good studies, who has always been my source of success, for seeing
me through my years of philosophical studies.
I
express my appreciation to my beloved family. I give special thanks to nne fulu
m n’anya, Mrs Lucy Muogbo, my siblings, Martin, Ifesinachi and Calistus for
your love, support and encouragement from the very beginning of my life. I
thank my Wonderful aunties Mrs Theresa Nwagulu, Ifeyinwa Nwolisa, Nkiru
Anagbogu, Ukamaka Onyiaoha, and Uchenna Uchendu. I express my loyal gratitude
to Her Majesty, Queen Theresa Nwagulu. I thank in a very special way my granny,
Mrs. Mary Obieluo May the good Lord continue to bless and reward you.
I
register my sincere and heartfelt gratitude to my wonderful and proficient
Moderator, Fr. Dr. Anselm Jimoh for his unceasing effort to make this work a
success. Thanks for your patience and for taking your time to read my work and
make suggestions and corrections to ensure I come up with a befitting work. I
thank also my Student Moderator, Bro. Nwanyanwu Christopher, I appreciate your
intelligence. May the good Lord continue to bless you.
I
thank my beloved congregation, Society of St. Paul. I thank the Provincial
counselor, Fr. Johnson Chacko, my superior, Fr. Blaise Kandathil and my
Formators, Fr. Joe Eruppakkatt and Fr. George Augustine for their directions,
support and encouragement. I thank all my brothers, both senior and junior,
especially Victor Erimmuo and Yohanna Bakam. May the good Lord reward you
abundantly for all you have been to me. I thank also my group members,
Johnbosco Nwankwo and Valentine Obumkaneme.
In
a special way I thank all who have motivated and inspired me, I thank most
specially Fr. Charles Anene, Fr. Izuu Ifem, Fr. Kosisochukwu Okosa, Rev.
Tochukwu Onyeagolu, Sis. Chisimdi Olisaemeka and Nwanyanwu Christopher.
Finally,
I thank the Great Seminary of Saints Peter and Paul. I thank the Rector,
Francis Adesina. I thank the Philosophical department of the University of
Ibadan and the philosophical department of Saints Peter and Paul Major Seminary
Ibadan, I thank most especially the incumbent and emeritus Heads of department,
Fr. Dr. Anselm Jimoh and Fr. Dr. Damian Ilodigwe. May the God Lord continue to
bless you all.
MUOGBO
MICHAEL IZUCHUKWU
JUNE,
2016.
TABLE
OF CONTENT
Title page………………………………………………………..…………………i
Certification……………………………………………………………………….ii
Dedication………………………………………………………………………...iii
Acknowledgement………………………………………………………………..iv
Table of content…………………………………………..………………………vi
GENERAL
INTRODUCTION
0.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM………………………………………………3
0.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES………………………………………………….4
0.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY……………………………………………………4
0.4 METHODOLOGY………………………………………………....................5
CHAPTER
ONE: TIME AS AN ISSUE IN METAPHYSICS
1.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………6
1.2 General notion of
time………………………………………………………7
1.3 The Perception of
Time……………………………………………………...10
1.4 Time as a subject of
metaphysics……………………………….....................14
1.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………...................18
CHAPTER
TWO: THE HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF TIME IN PHILOSOPHY
2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………20
2.2 Time in the history of
thought………………………………………………21
2.2.1
Time in Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle……………………...22
2.2.2 Time in Medieval Philosophy: Augustine and Aquinas……………….24
2.2.3 Time in Modern and Contemporary philosophy: Heidegger
and McTaggart……………………………………………………………………26
2.2.4
Time in African Metaphysics: John Mbiti…………..............................28
2.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………29
CHAPTER
THREE: BERGSON’S NOTION OF TIME
3.1
Introduction…………………………………………………………………31
3.2 Bergson’s conception of
time………………………………………………32
3.2.1 Pure time and alloyed
time………………………………………...35
3.2.2 Homogenous time and concrete
duration…………………………37
3.2.3 Time in relation to consciousness………………………………….40
3.3
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………43
CHAPTER
FOUR: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BERGSON’S NOTION OF TIME
4.1
Introduction…………………………………………………………………..45
4.2 The Strangeness of Bergson’s
Idea…………………………………………45
4.3 Reactions to Bergson’s Notion of
time………………………………………46
4.3.1
Bergson contrasted to McTarggart…………………………………49
4.3.2
Bergson compared with Heidegger………………………………51
4.4 The Implication of Bergson’s
Notion of Time for Metaphysics……………..53
4.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...55
GENERAL
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………57
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………60
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Bergson
in his theory of duration conceives time as duree
reelle (real duration). According to Bergson, real duration is the form
which our conscious state takes when our ego lets itself live, and avoids the
separation of its present state from its former states. This suggests that the
real continuum of time is the continuum of duration that we understand when we
look at our states of consciousness in terms of succession without distinction,
in terms of their co-existence. Therefore, time involves a co-existence of past
and present, and not simply a continuity of succession; it is real, concrete
and effective.
The
idea of time seems easy and simple to understand. However, a closer examination
of this concept will reveal that it is not easy to understand. The concept of
time has raised a lot of philosophical arguments. Some Philosophers like St.
Augustine and McTarggart argued that time is not real; they argue that it is
merely phenomenal, that is to say subjective. St Augustine argued that time is
nothing in reality but exists only in the mind’s apprehension of reality.
McTarggart argued that there is nothing as time, and that temporal orders are
mere appearances. On the other hand, some Philosophers like Kant are of the
view that it is real. Kant argued that time is a pure form of sensuous
intuition. However, this is to show that time is not just a thing but a notion
which depend upon the particular point of view one takes.
Time
is metaphysically puzzling and has been of philosophical interest. The
considered theories and studies of time offer a contrastive analysis of time as
a continuum. Time presupposes a representation of past, present, and future; it
is a non-spatial continuum that is measured in terms of
succession of events from past through present to future. Time lacks spatial
dimension. Simply, it is a system of measuring intervals. There has been
a tendency to treat human knowledge in a rigid fashion;[1]
philosophers agree and disagree on different notions of time. Therefore, the
concept of time has attracted responses from critical reflective minds.
Philosophers like Kant, Heidegger, Russell, Newton and others have explained
the concept of time in their various works.
In addressing the difficulties with
regards to the concept of time, Philosophers are divided into two groups:
process philosophers and the philosophers of manifold. The process
philosophers, like Alfred North Whitehead hold that the flow of time is an
important metaphysical fact. Henri Bergson as a process philosopher holds that
this flow can be grasped only by a non-rational intuition. For Bergson, the
scientific concept of time as a dimension is a misrepresentation of reality.
Contrary to these views, the philosophers of the manifold like St. Augustine
and McTarggart hold that the flow of time and human advancement through time is
an illusion, implying that the change of an event from being a
future or present to being a past is illusive.
This research seeks to expose
Bergson’s notion of time and the implications for metaphysics. Bergson developed
his notion of time and metaphysics in his first work, Time and Free Will, which is a defense of freewill in response to
Immanuel Kant, who believes that freewill is only possible outside of time and
space. Time is central, and is a unifying element running through Bergson’s
philosophical ideas. Bergson’s work on Time
and Free Will suggests that Time is a bridge that overcomes the dichotomy
between the internal mind and the external mind. Time characterizes objective
and subjective experiences[2].
Bergson made a distinction between two approaches to time: scientific time
(alloyed time) and duration (pure time).
0.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Time runs through ages and it is conceived differently by
different philosophers in different ages. Kant’s theory of time is one of the
prevailing theories of time before Bergson’s. Kant holds that freewill is only
possible outside of space and time. Bergson perceived and sought to improve the
inadequacies of this theory. Bergson’s theory of time is revolutionary; he
sought to show that the arguments against freewill are a result of the
misunderstanding of the concept of time. Primarily, Bergson attempts to address
the issues of consciousness and freewill in relation to time.
Time for Bergson, bridges the internal mind and the external
world. However, I seek to explore and expose Bergson’s notion of time and see
how he corrected the misconception he perceived from former theories of time
before his.
0.2 AIMS
AND OBJECTIVES
The interest of this paper is to
consider the notion of time as it is understood and theorized by Bergson. This
paper will explore and expose Bergson’s theory of time to see what it proposes
and also to point out possible implications for metaphysics. The purpose of
doing this is:
i.
To
explore, understand and expose Bergson’s notion of time.
ii.
To
clarify the difference between alloyed time and duration as discussed by
Bergson.
iii.
To
know the possible implications of Bergson’s doctrine for metaphysics.
iv.
To
contribute to our knowledge of time.
0.3 SCOPE
OF THE STUDY
This work gives a general overview
of time; it extends to other scholars’ idea of time and the disagreements to
Bergson’s theory of time, but it’s primary interest and focus is specifically
on Bergson’s theory of time and the implications of his doctrine for
metaphysics.
0.4 METHODOLOGY
To ensure that the aims and
objectives of this research are achieved, we shall adopt an expository and
critical method. It will primarily consult Bergson’s text on Time and Freewill, and other relevant
texts in the exposition and analysis of Bergson’s notion of time. It would
equally involve the consideration of others scholars’ notion of time and
reactions to Bergson’s conception of time. We will equally rely on materials
and libraries on the web.
This essay shall be divided into
four chapters. The first chapter shall attempt to give a general background to
the notion of time. We shall also consider time as a subject of metaphysics.
The second chapter shall expose the history of time in philosophy; selected
notions of time as postulated by philosophers like Augustine and Heidegger
before Bergson shall be considered. This will serve as a background to our
understanding of Bergson’s notion of time. The third chapter, which would be
the core of this essay shall critically expose and analyze Bergson’s notion of
time as a continuum. The fourth chapter shall, by way of evaluation contrast
Bergson’s notion of time with that of some of his contemporaries and consider
the implications of his theory for metaphysics. Thereafter, I shall present a
general conclusion.
CHAPTER ONE
TIME AS AN ISSUE IN METAPHYSICS
1.1
INTRODUCTION
Time is a familiar
concept, but yet we cannot grasp the whole reality of it. We experience time in
our everyday life. ‘Time waits for no one’. Within time, we seize and lose
opportunities, we recognize events and we make history. Time is a continuum within which
events occur; it is a dimension representing successions of events and actions.
Within
its most familiar conception, we perceive time in seconds, minutes, hours,
days, weeks and so on. As a matter of fact, the philosophical, psychological
and physical notion of time goes far beyond the common understanding of time.
But common to all notions of time is the fact that time is a continuum; it
changes in character gradually in very slight stages without clear points of
division.
Everything that
happens takes place and is experienced in time. The sequence in motion is the
factor that informs the mind of the passage of time. Time is not an academic
wisdom but, rational beings are inherently constituted with natural capacities
to conceive time according to the way time influences their being. This chapter
will give a general notion of time and its perception, and then consider it as
a subject of metaphysics.
1.2
THE
GENERAL NOTION OF TIME
By a general notion of
time, I suppose what tickles the mind when the concept of time is pronounced.
Time is of a practical convenience in our everyday life, but our common
understanding of the concept of time is very limited; it is seen either as a
process of transition or as a medium through which events in human experiences
take place. Time is one of the most used concepts in our world today; it cuts
across all works of our everyday life, both literate and illiterate, race, sex,
colour and nations.
The physical notion of
time is common and familiar to us. Time as conceived in physics implies the
clock time; it involves the establishment of time scale to measure occurrences
of events. This notion of time depends on mathematical exactness. The ‘physics’
notion of time affirms the complexity of time; scientists can only demarcate
time with seconds, minutes and so on. Based on this notion of time, the
relativity theory of Albert Einstein is used to show how time changes with
motion. This ‘physics’ notion of time includes a past, present, and
future which supports a conception of the calendar.
Psychologically, time is
seen as a dimension of our experience and our activity. This dimension does not
correspond to simple physical reality. Our experience of change imposes on us
the concept of time. Two aspects are distinguished in the psychological concept
of time: (a) the sequence and order of change (b) the duration of change. The
interlocking of order and duration defines the process of change.
Psychologically we conceive and experience time autonomously as series of
change; time of the season, time of the day and night, time of human life, time
of activities and so forth.[3]
Although the relativity
theory of Einstein established the subjective nature of the physical phenomenon
of time, the significance of the psychological interpretation of this relativity
phenomenon has been controversial for philosophers. Philosophically, Kant
believed the conception of time to be an innate ability, he held that it
influences the way people conceive and experience the world. Philosophers still
have controversies over what a proper conception of time should be like. The
philosophical definitions and conceptions are too trivial or simply cryptic.
However, a special focus would be on philosophical time, rather than a physical
time or psychological time.
Time is a persuasive
component and a fundamental concept in our physical, psychological and
philosophical life; we are more or less familiar with the concept of time. Time
flows and we advance through it. The concept of time is related with the motion
and the change in the objects around us. All objects begin, develop and end in
time.
The general notion of
time concerns issues that go beyond physics, psychology and philosophy. St
Augustine once wrote ‘what is time? If you do not ask me, I know. If you ask
me, I do not know’. This in a way is saying that time cannot be defined. His
words also impress upon us the fact that we too often assume a clear and
complete knowledge of things that have baffled the greatest of thinkers.[4]
However, he confidently wrote, though still arbitrarily, about the origin of
time, saying essentially that time comes from the future which does not exist
yet; it moves into the present which has no durations; and it goes into the
past which no longer exists.[5]
Time like other realities cannot be given a strict definition; it can only be
descriptively defined. This is the case with the terms of Aristotle and St.
Thomas Aquinas, who describe time as a numbering of movements with regards to
“a before and after”. Defining time descriptively would imply two elements: a
material and a formal element, which are objective and subjective respectively.
The material element of time is the movement, change and succession while, the
formal element is our numbering or counting of the movement.
Time as a numbering of
movement can be affirmed in our experience of it. We note certain movements
that are important to us and regular in their occurrences in nature. For
example, a complete movement of the earth on its axis is a day, and seven of
such movement is a week. Hence, time in the ordinary and familiar sense is
necessary in our daily life. The general notion of time consists of three
dimensions which are necessary for a proper conception of time: past, present
and future. The present is constantly being experienced but it fleets
momentarily; if we pause to consider any present moment, sooner will it vanish
into the past. But in our everyday life, we cannot help relating the present to the past and
the future. This shows the imperfect reality of time. The past is gone, the future
is yet to come and the present has a momentary indivisible existence, but they
are all proper to a conception of time. The past contains our acquired
experience, the present contains our existence and the future contains our
hope.
1.3
THE
PERCEPTION OF TIME
Perception is an
action by which the finite brain explores the infinite world. By acting, the
brain thrusts into the body and predicts sensory consequences. Perception is
the quality of being aware of things through the physical senses. In relation
to time perception is entirely different from the statements afore, because we do not have any sensory
receptor through which we perceive time. Rather we perceive events in time. We
measure the circle of time by marks of actions and events perceived in repetitive
motion. The question of the perception of time is a philosophical question with
a biological answer, in the sense that perception has to do with the senses
and, the senses with regards to responding to stimuli and the act of perceiving
is a classic subject of biology.
One of the
greatest mysteries in life is the mystery of time. Everything happens in time,
it is tied to our consciousness.[6]
The concept of time is one of the concepts through which human beings endeavor
to make sense of the reality of their being in daily life. It is a
multi-dimensional concept, having as it does, various aspects: commonsensical,
historical, scientific, psychological and metaphysical.
Commonly we speak
of having a sense of timing. The sense of timing is immediate and unreflective,
but the concept of time is abstract and general. Man is able to estimate
directly the duration of events, with precisions that can be checked by
comparing intervals. The perception of time and its passage distinguishes time
from physical duration. Time perception is a subjective experience which
differs between circumstances. Time perception is a product of human evolution;
it is not an innate process, but a complex activity we develop as we grow. The
perception of time is bound up with memory; our memory of events helps us to
form a perception of time. Time is perceived with respect to the series of
events in a sequence. As humans we perceive things with a particular sense of
perception, but our perception of time is obviously not limited to any of the
senses. As a matter of fact, it would be strange to say that we see, hear,
touch or taste time, but this does not over rule the fact that we perceive and
have our experiences of time. If our senses fail for some time, we could still
feel the passage of time through other factors that may not be visible, or
perhaps there is a special faculty through which we ascertain our perception of
time. This, of course, may exclude exceptional cases like states of
unconsciousness. To perceive is to become aware of stimulation. Awareness of
time may, at first glance, seem inconsistent with the definition of perception.
Since our perception of time is through awareness, then it is inseparably tied
to motion and events.
The nature of time
pervades many areas of intellectual thought especially philosophy, psychology
and physics. The perception of time is of special interest to philosophy; there
is a quest in philosophy to grasp the reality of time in its totality. The
interest here is not of the ‘physical’ notion of time, but of the perception
and awareness of it. It is obvious that there is no sensory organ to perceive
time; neither is there any direct, observable sensation emanating from time
stimuli. This is just to affirm that time does not have the qualities of most
physical stimuli. However, this elusive nature of time perception or experience
is detailed in Thomas Mann’s The Magic
Mountain by the protagonist, Hans Castorp:
“…what
is time? Can you answer me that? Space we perceive with our organs, with our
senses of sight and touch. Good. But which is our organ of time…how can we
possibly measure anything about which we actually know nothing, not even a
single one of its properties? We say of time that it passes. Very good, let it
pass. But to be able to measure it… to be susceptible of being measured, time
must flow evenly, but who ever said it did that? As far as our consciousness is
concerned it doesn’t, we only assume that it does, for the sake of
consciousness; our units of measurement are purely arbitrary, sheer
conviction.”[7]
Time is not an immediately given
property; it is a concept perceive indirectly. Biologically, there are
cognitive basis for the perception of time, given the evidence of behavioural
activities, it is reasonable to seek a “Biological clock”, that is, mechanism
for perceiving time in the nervous system.[8]
The concept of an internal sense assumes that there is a continuous and
automatic biological rhythm, not directly influenced by external stimulation,
with which the organism compares the duration of stimuli or events. Periodic
events with measurable frequencies are found in the electrical activity of the
brain, the pulse and heartbeat.[9]
Time perception is
an instance of time consciousness; it is an outcome of a cognitive process. The
perception of time is a question of our experience and awareness of the flow of
time, we do not perceive time as such but rather we perceive changes or events
in time. Time is a continuum that is so much linked with motion and change.
Time lacks spatial dimension, it is a continuum and not a phenomenon. In the
perception of time, the succession of events is a clear element. Time is not to
be identified with the cause-effect phenomena because, time simply measure
changes; it does not create changes.
Our perception is
not of time itself but of the flow of it. During instances, ‘present’ turn to
‘past’ and ‘future’ turn into ‘present’. We experience and note this passage of
time because they differ from each other in comparison; we have memories of the
‘past’, we are constantly experiencing the ‘present’ but we know nothing of the
‘future’. We cannot
control the flow of time; we cannot
prevent moments of the present from going down to the past, and we equally
cannot prevent near future from coming into the present. Time has been a
subject of philosophy over years, but there are still issues that are
controversial about what we know of time. However, as a study in philosophy,
time is basically a subject of metaphysics.
1.4
TIME
AS A SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS
Metaphysics
is a general attempt to make sense of reality. However, the popular meaning of
metaphysics is different from the philosophical meaning. The popular meaning of
metaphysics deals with the out-of-the-physical
experiences. The popular concept of metaphysics consists of notions that are
not compactible to science and reason. However, philosophical metaphysics
consist of scientific theories, and makes use of logical arguments to arrive at
its results. Moreover, philosophical metaphysics takes logical consistency and
coherency as necessary conditions of truth.
The philosophical area of
metaphysics contains some of the most difficult, profound, and abstract theories
produced by critical-reflective minds. Metaphysics is faced with the task of
coming to terms with reality and making theories about them. Time is one of the
basic concepts considered by metaphysics. Time has always been regarded by many
philosophers as a dark subject of speculation, fundamentally enigmatic and even
incomprehensible.[10]
Many metaphysicians like John McTarggart have denied the reality of time. With
reference to the definition of metaphysics given in the above paragraph,
metaphysic seeks to make more lucid the theories with regards to the reality of
time continuum.
As a subject of metaphysics,
time is ontological. The earliest influential metaphysical theory is Plato’s;
Plato divided reality into two sorts with regards to their relations to time.
For Plato, true beings belong to the everlasting, the ideal world, while the
imperfect beings belong to the physical realm, which comes to be and passes
away in time. The reliance on time for the classification of being became more
prominent in the medieval metaphysics, where time-related concepts, especially
eternity were used as paradigm for being. “To be” in the perfect sense is to be eternal and anything else
“is” only to the extent that it imitates the eternal mode of being.”[11]
With the advent of modern thinking, there was a shift of emphasis from
‘eternity’ to ‘time’ as the central feature of reality. Immanuel Kant argues
that time is the fundamental feature of which the mind understands reality.
Martin Heidegger argues that
time is the meaning of being itself. Time equally plays a fundamental role in
the twentieth-century analytic metaphysics where substances, events, persons,
and change are understood in the light of their temporal existence in relation
to time. Many questions have been raised with regards to time as a subject of
metaphysics questions like: does reality divide into two realms, the eternal
and the temporal, or does reality consist of only time?
Being a subject of
metaphysics, many theories and definitions have been propounded with regards to
the nature and reality of time. Time is ‘a moving image of eternity’ (Plato),
‘a present of things past, memory, a present of things future, expectation’
(Augustine). These definitions made use of temporal notions, although time may
not admit of definition because there are many questions about time yet to be
answered by definitions.
In recent times,
McTaggart’s argument that time is not real, mark the starting point of recent
works on time as a subject of metaphysics. McTaggart claims that things in time
can be ordered in two ways: A-series and B-series. The A-series orders events
and time in terms of the property of being past, present or future. The
B-series orders events and time in terms of being ‘earlier than’ and ‘later
than’. McTaggart argues first that the B-series presupposes the A-series and,
secondly, that the assumption that there is an A-series leads to a
contradiction. He finally concludes that time is unreal.
In
metaphysics, time is a concept that has always been considered alongside space.
Why this is so is clear from the claims of Plato and Aristotle. For Plato, time
is “the moving image of eternity.” It is the type of being which characterizes
the world of becoming, which is sensible and therefore spatial. Aristotle makes
this connection even more explicit since time is the numbering of motion, and
motion is a change of place.[12] The most striking difference between time and
space is the dynamic character of time, in direct experience, time is fleeting:
time passes. Space is static. For example, in relation to the
dynamism of time, one may often say that ‘a time past is gone forever’, and in
relation to the static nature of space, we often say that ‘soldiers come and
go, but the barrack remains where it is’. This characteristic feature of
experiential time is taken as a metaphysical base in the A-theory of time, in
John McTaggart’s famous terminology. The A-theory regards the passage of time
as not just a feature of our experience, but it characterizes time itself
independently of any experience of it; time flows with a ‘now’ that constantly
shifts the boundary between Past and Future. According to McTaggart, in his
“The Unreality of Time”, the B-theory
by contrast recognizes temporal relations, like ‘earlier than’ and ‘later
than’, without identifying a moving now. The
A-theory does not neglect the ‘Now’, it accounts for our experience of passage.
The A-theory is descriptive.
1.5
CONCLUSION
The notion and analysis
of time as a continuum indicates that our perception of time is based on the
consequences of our experience with regards to events and motion. For example,
going with the theories of physics, the consequences of the earth completing a
rotation round its axis is a day, and the consequences of seven such rotations
is a week. However, the question of time perception is a philosophical
(metaphysical) question with a biological answer, though aided by theories from
physics, psychology and philosophy. It has a biological answer because to
perceive, we have to make use of the senses, although there is no specific
sensory receptor for perceiving time, but even if we credit our knowledge and
perception of time to awareness and consciousness, it is still coming back to a
biological answer because being conscious presupposes that we can see, feel,
touch, perceive and respond to stimuli at given instances. The perception of
time and consciousness is inextricably linked.
Time
is basically a subject of physics, psychology and philosophy, amongst these
disciplines metaphysics deals with time more specifically. Metaphysics, in
dealing with the concept of time consults the theories from these other
disciplines mentioned above. For instance in the ‘physics’ notion of time, it
is always counted or measured in seconds, minutes, hours and other such
concepts. In the clock time (‘physics time’), between one minute, two seconds
after ten (10:01:02) and one minute, three
seconds after ten (10:01:03) is one second,
therefore between the seconds are supposed to be microseconds, which the clock
time is ignoring, and this is where metaphysics comes in. Time is also tied to
physical realities, given the fact that when one is taken away from physical
realities he loses to some extent his sense of time. For instance, if one is
locked up in a dungeon, where he have no means to perceive the passage of time,
after one week, if you take him out of the dungeon, he would probably not know
how many days he spent in the dungeon because, he was taken away from physical
realities that enables time perception. This is to show that being conscious is
not enough for a proper perception of time. This explanation is tagged to
duration; and this is the basic position of Bergson. For Bergson, time is duree reelle (real duration).
CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF TIME IN
PHILOSOPHY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Time
is the single most pervasive component of our experience. For this reason time
has received intensive attention from philosophy. Reflection on our
ordinary-tensed language of time has led many to posit a relation of
metaphysical importance between time and existence. Closely connected with such
intuitions are claims to the effect that time is unlike space, and in deep and
important ways.[13]
Down
the ages of philosophy, different philosophers, like Plato, Aristotle,
Augustine, Aquinas, Kant and many others, who theorized about time have
different understanding of time. However, within the understanding and the
different theories of these different philosophers, there have been
inadequacies, as there have been some disagreements regarding the reality of
time as a continuum. Thus this chapter will attempt to see the different
conceptions of time down the history of philosophy, taking cognizance of
specific theories and conceptions of time from each epoch of philosophy.
2.2 TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT
Time
has been more puzzling than space. It has frequently struck philosophers as
mysterious. Some have even seen it as incapable of rational discursive
treatment and that we can only grasp it by intuition. This defeatist attitude
probably arises from the fact that time always seem to mysteriously slip away
from us; no sooner do we grasp a bit of it in our consciousness than it has
slipped away into the past.[14]
The notion of time as a succession is perhaps the most commonly accepted
conception of time. But although many philosophers accept this characterization
of time, they often disagree among themselves on other issues. One of the most
important is the debate as to whether time is absolute or relational in nature.[15]
However, in the history of thought, time has been considered as reality and
illusion. Two groups of philosophers; Process Philosophers and the Philosophers
of the Manifold, hold these positions respectively. Time has a great history
down the ages of philosophy because it has been conceived differently in
different ages and yet more differently by individual philosophers. As such, it
would be apposite here to concisely expose the transition of the discourse on
time, basing it primarily on specific conceptions of time from the ancient
epoch of western philosophy to the contemporary epoch.
2.2.1 TIME IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY:
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE
The
Greeks conceive time as something cyclic or circular returning to itself,
self-enclosed under the influence of astronomical movements which command and
regulate its course with reality. Ancient philosophy is the philosophy of the
Greco-Roman world from the sixth century BC to the sixth century AD, this
period of philosophy laid the foundations for all subsequent Western
philosophy. Plato and Aristotle are two of the greatest figures in this period.
Plato
was the first to make a systematic attempt to describe time philosophically.
His conception and theory of time is found in his work Timaeus. For Plato, time is the external principle that governs the
universe; both the universe and time exist together through the work of Demiurge. Plato’s theory of time is
bound with idealism. According to him, there is an ideal world where reality is
in its highest perfection; the things of our world are reflections world of
ideas. Time for Plato is a moving image of eternity.[16]
Plato conceived time to be infinite in nature, the quality he derived from time
is that of an imitation. He says:
when the father and creator saw the
universe which he made moving and living, the created image of the eternal
gods, he rejoiced, and in his joy determined to make the copy still more like
the original, and this was an eternal being, he sought to make the universe
eternal, so far as might be.[17]
In
the Timaeus Plato describes time as
the moving image of eternity. He says that time is the movement of the sphere
whose unvarying circular course imitates the unchangeable life of living
creatures. “Its revolution numbers the interval called days in their wandering
but regularly repeated motions, the seven planets serve as instruments of time,
determining and preserving number of fixed intervals of time.”[18]
Aristotle
on the other hand conceives time differently from Plato. Aristotle’s conception
of time is in the fourth book of his Physics.
Aristotle defined time as a measure of motion according to “before” and
“after”.[19]
Aristotle argues that time is manifested in change of things but change itself
is not time.
For
Aristotle, time is neither movement nor independent of movement, for not only
do we measure the movement by time, but we equally measure time by the movement
because they define each other; time is the number and measure of motion.
According to Aristotle, time is made up of three interlocking phases: the
present or the “now”, the past or the “no longer”, and the future or the “not
yet now”. The present is considered as a link between the past and the future.
The past and the future are not existent. It is only the “now” that is real and
existent, others are not existent. In the strict sense, time is not a manifold
of “nows”, but consists only of this “now”; any other now is either “no longer”
or “not yet” and therefore non-existent.[20]
2.2.2 TIME IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY:
AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS
Medieval
philosophy is the philosophy of the medieval period of western philosophy from
about AD 400-1400; this is roughly the period between the fall of Rome and the
Renaissance. Medieval philosophers are the historical successors of the
philosophers of antiquity or ancient philosophers.[21]
Contending
with the problem of time, Augustine conceives time as the duration of a finite
nature which cannot be complete all at once, and which needs to develop through
successive and continuous phases. The phases as meant by Augustine are the
past, the present, and the future. According to Augustine’s conception of time,
the past is the time which is no more, the future is the time which is not yet,
and the present is the time which is now, but will not always be. According to
Augustine, the possibility of the past and future depends on the nature of the
things which have a present, those things which cannot always be present;
theirs is a presence that passes away. If they do not pass, there would be no
past and if they would not be something new, then the future would not exist.
Passing and change as characteristics of the present, distinguishes time from
eternity; time is a nunc transiens.
Eternity is a present which never passes, a nunc
stans.[22]
Thomas
Aquinas holds that as far as temporality is concerned, only the present exist.
He equally holds that God knows immediately, all at once, in a single act, the
past, the present, and the future. Aquinas conceive time in the same light as
Aristotle, he sees time as the measure of motion with regards to “before” and
“after”. For Aquinas, “eternity is a type of duration differing from time in
two ways; the eternal was no succession of instant but exist entirely at once”.[23]
Aquinas holds time to be an existence in nature like space, motion and, place.
But it is one that is discovered in the process of counting or numbering, a
numbering done by human mind. As a totality, time is a continuum of “nows”
which are disentangled through the “numerous” of the “before now” and the
“after now”. Aquinas in a way equates
time with mutability when he says that:
Time is the duration of being which is
mutable in its existence and operation. Therefore the essence of a being which
exist in time does not receive its total existence from beginning, but
successively acquires it with change.[24]
Time
is a successive duration; this type of duration for Aquinas is measure.
Therefore Aquinas concludes that time can be defined as measure; measure in the
sense that it is not a measure which measures, because if it does, then any
measure would be time, rather it is a measure which is measured.
2.2.3 TIME IN MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY
PHILOSOPHY: HEIDEGGER AND MCTAGGART
Time
plays a central role in Martin Heidegger’s thought, his notion of time is made
explicit in his work Being and Time.
He held that the ontological meaning of being is time. Heidegger centers on the
future as the critical presence of time. In his conception of time, Heidegger
holds that there are two possible notions of time: (a) Authentic time and (b)
Inauthentic time. These are derived from the authentic Dasein and inauthentic Dasein
respectively. The Dasein is finite;
it has a beginning and an end. The Dasein
has a basic state of care; care here is not anxiety but the desire for
authentic living which constitutes the present.
Authentic time is Dasein’s time
and is equally regarded as primordial time; it is based on the authentic self.
The inauthentic time is the ordinary notion of time as duration; it is finite
and understood in terms of the present. According to Heidegger, the past,
present and future are the structural constituting part of time, and they
correspond to the ‘facticity’, ‘existence’ and ‘falling’ of Dasein respectively.[25]
Heidegger says that real time cannot be quantified, for example: “half an hour
is not thirty minutes but a duration (Dauer)
which has no ‘length’ at all in the sense of quantitative stretch.”[26]
In
recent times, John McTaggart’s “The Unreality of
Time” paves way for debate on
the concept of time as a metaphysical subject. McTaggart came in with his
position to oppose the reality of time. Hence he asserts that time is not real.
In his position, McTaggart claims that things and events in time, and the time
which they occur can be ordered in two ways: the A-series and the B-series. The
A-series orders events and time in terms of their tensed properties of being
past, present and future, while the B-series orders time and events in terms of
their relationship of being earlier than and later than.
McTaggart’s
argument against the reality of time is in two parts: firstly, there would be
no time if nothing changed; the world involves genuine change only if events
undergo change. McTaggart however holds that events can change only with
respect to tensed properties (past, present, and future). Secondly, tensed
properties are mutually incompatible. In order to avoid contradictions, events
must have incompatible tensed properties at different times. Specifications of
relevant times will involve complex tensed sentences with different
truth-values at different times. So there is need to specify relevant times.
This will result a sequence of move and countermove that can be indefinitely
repeated, causing an infinite regress. This regress as McTaggart holds is
vicious, since there is contradiction in every stage of it. “The second part of
McTaggart’s argument revolves around the claim that the A-series does not,
after all provide a coherent temporal ordering of events: for the way in which
the A-series allows for change leads to the contradiction of supposing that one
and the same event is both past and future. Hence, McTaggart concludes, neither
A-series nor B-series yields a coherent conception of a temporal ordering of
events, and we must conclude that our very conception of events as ordered in
time is illusory”.[27]
2.2.4 TIME IN AFRICAN METAPHYSICS: JOHN
MBITI
Time
reckoning in Africa is not mathematical or numerical but phenomenal; time is
connected to events. In African context, time has to be experienced in order to
make sense; the future has not been experienced, it makes no sense to the
African, and cannot constitute part of time, it cannot be thought of, if it
does not fall within the rhythm of natural phenomena. Time for the African is a
composition of events which have occurred, those taking place now, and those
which are immediately to occur. According to John Mbiti, “What has not taken
place or what has no likelihood of an immediate occurrence falls in the
category of no time”,[28]
what is certain to occur or what falls within the category of natural
phenomenon, is in the category of the inevitable or potential time.
In
the conception of John Mbiti, time is a two-dimensional phenomenon with a long
past, a present and virtually no future. There is a potential time and actual
time. Potential time is the time that constitutes events that are within the
rhythm of natural phenomena and events in the immediate future. Actual time is
the time that consists of the present and the past; it moves backward rather
than forward. Within the context of the East African language which Mbiti
carried out his research, there is no expression to convey the idea of the
distant future, while the short future is seen as an extension of the present.
However, the people have little or no active interest in events that are in the
future beyond.
2.3 CONCLUSION
Given
that time is the characteristic mode of being of every finite nature, which
cannot be present at once, but needs to express itself in successive and
continuous phases, and for the fact that the universe always remains in a
finite nature as Augustine observes, the world has its origin in time and not
eternity. Our world seemingly, is structured by time. Contingent beings around
us seem to have their being in time. Some philosophers like Thomas Aquinas
claims that God is not temporal as contingent beings and therefore he is outside
of time. These ideas have their flaws; time is so perplexing. However
throughout the history of thought, metaphysicians have presented arguments to
prove the reality or non-reality of time.
We
have considered particular theory(s) of time in western philosophy. After
seeing these theories, we have concluded that time is an indispensable element
of our everyday life, and that the problem of time is still an open issue in
philosophy. On this note, we wish to expose Bergson’s position on the problem
of time in the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
BERGSON’S NOTION OF TIME
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Bergson’s philosophy is dualistic in
nature; he sees the world as being divided into two: life and matter. Bergson’s
conception of time consists in creativity not statism. His understanding of
time is influenced by his view of what matter is, claiming that the duration of
a thing manifest the degradation of its essence. He identifies real duration
with time perceived as indivisible. He is primarily interested in time as an
inner experience.
For
Bergson, time is not only real outside the mind but also the very essence of
reality and the world as grasped in our deeper penetration of it, is nothing
but pure duration. Pure duration for him “is the form which the succession of
our conscious states assumes when our ego let itself live, when it refrains
from separating its present state from its former states”.[29]
The conception of duration is fundamental to his philosophy.
3.2 BERGSON’S CONCEPTION OF TIME
Bergson affirms the reality of time
because if time is unreal, then the fundamental characteristics of consciousness
will be a delusion. Bergson addressed time not as an abstract notion but he
examined it as part of a real process. Bergson argues for the position that
time involves a coexistence of the past and present and not simply a continuity
of succession as Kant holds. Bergson sees the ordinary conception of time as
false. He sees the ordinary conception of time as a homogeneous medium. While
showing how the ordinary notion of time misleads us, he says that:
We shall see that time conceived
under the form of an unbounded homogeneous medium, is nothing but the ghost of
space haunting the reflective consciousness… we may therefore surmise that
time, conceived under the form of a homogeneous medium, is some spurious
concept, due to the trespassing of the idea of space upon the field of pure
consciousness.[30]
Time,
therefore, must be conceived independent of space.
Having rendered the ordinary notion of time false,
Bergson proceeds to make clear what time really is in his view: Time is neither
an abstract notion nor a disputable fact, it is concrete, real and effective.
Bergson conceives time as la duree
(duration). Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into
the future and which swells as it advances.[31]
The conception of duration is basic to the reality of time as continuity. The
true view of “time as duration” implies that it expands, contracts, and
intensifies itself more and more.
Bergson makes a clear distinction
between two forms of time: pure time and mathematical time. Pure time is real
duration which is continuous and indivisible, while mathematical time is a
measured duration which is divisible into units and intervals which are not
reflections of real time. Accordingly, Bergson argues that real time cannot be
mathematically measured because it is a lived time. Trying to measure real time
will result into a disruption in time. Therefore, to understand the flow of
time, the intellect forms concepts of time as consisting of defined intervals,
but attempting to intellectualize the experience of duration is to falsify it.
Real duration can only be experienced by intuition.
Duration
is characterized by pure heterogeneity; it is the experienced change itself,
the directly intuited non-spatial stream of consciousness in which past,
present and future flow into one another.[32]
Pure duration makes a combination of the past and present as an organic whole;
it perceives the past and present in each other. It is not a succession of
discrete moments. For Bergson:
Pure duration is the form which the
succession of our conscious state assumes when our ego lets itself live, when
it refrains from separating its present state from its former state.[33]
This informs the uniqueness of every moment of
duration. There is no real separation between former and present states of
consciousness apart from artificial constructions of thought because of the
flow and permeation of psychic states into one another. We can thus conceive of
succession without distinction, and see it as a mutual penetration and
interconnection that cannot be distinguished or isolated except by abstract
thought. In consciousness there is nothing static. Pure duration is wholly qualitative. It cannot be measured unless
it is symbolically represented in space. There is order of succession in
duration, pure duration implies pure succession. In pure succession we set our
conscious states side by side in such a way that we perceive them
simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another. Therefore,
pure duration is radically heterogeneous.
Time
is often conceived alongside space. Bergson did not differ much in this regard.
He argues that there are two possible conceptions of time: time conceived
alongside space and time conceived independent of space. Bergson distinguishes
between these two conceptions of time. This distinction can be
regarded as a distinction between scientific time and pure time or abstract
time and concrete time. According to Bergson, time conceived in space is
“alloyed time” and time conceived independent of space is “pure time”.
3.2.1 PURE TIME AND ALLOYED TIME
The
distinction of Bergson between time that occurs in theories of natural sciences
and the time that we directly experience is of central importance to his notion
of time. The two possible conceptions of time according to Bergson are: (a)
pure time and (b) alloyed time. These two conceptions came about in an attempt
to separate pure time from space and also to reassess the mixed up notion
handed down by Kant which says that time and space are co-extensive. He writes
that, there are indeed “two possible conceptions of time, the one free from all
alloys, the other surreptitiously bringing in the idea of space.”[34]
Here Bergson distinguishes between
time as we actually experience it, lived time which he calls ‘real duration’ (durée
réelle), and the mechanistic time of science (the clock time).
Pure time is the time conceived independent of space.
It is the real time, a product of mental synthesis and a time understood by
itself. It is continual, indivisible and irreversible. This is the time Bergson
conceives as la duree. This time is a
constituent of true duration. Pure time is heterogeneous in character. We are
aware of this time in relation to ourselves, because it does not refer to
existence of multiplicity of material objects in space, rather it refers to a
non-spatial multiplicity, that of conscious states. This time cannot be
measured by clocks or dials, but only by conscious beings. The intellect does
not grasp it, but we can have an intuition of it, we do not think it, but we
live it because life transcends the intellect. This time is not quantitative
but qualitative.
Bergson tries to show case the qualitative character
of pure time in these words:
when we hear a series of blows of a
hammer, the sounds form an indivisible melody in so far as they are pure
sensations, and, here again, give rise to a dynamic progress; but, knowing that
the same objective cause is at work, we cut up this progress into phases which
we then regard as identical; and this multiplicity of elements no longer being
conceivable except by being set out in space, since they have now become identical,
we are necessarily led to the idea of a homogeneous time, the symbolical image
of real duration.[35]
Alloyed time implies a representation of space. This
time as Bergson conceives it consists
of superimposed spatial concepts into time. It is not a real time,
rather it is the ordinary notion of time, which constitute of seconds, minutes,
hours, days and so on. Alloyed time is a result of spatialising time and making
it static. It is a distorted version of real time. The alloyed time is “a
spurious concept due to the illicit introduction of the idea of space, and to
our application of the notion of space, which is applicable to physical
objects, to states of consciousness, to which it is really inapplicable.”[36]
It expresses duration in terms of extensity and makes succession a form of a
continuous line. Alloyed time in Bergson’s view does not give the real nature
of time; he characterized it as the ghost of time. Holding alloyed time to be
real is like making a mechanical explanation of a fact and then substituting
the explanation for the fact itself.
3.2.2 HOMOGENEOUS TIME AND CONCRETE
DURATION
Time is tricky; our experiences of it necessarily do
not always conform to the way we think about it. We assume time to be
co-extensive with space, making it a homogeneous medium. If this is the case it
would be objectively measurable, and also known as clock-time. In opposition to
this, Bergson claims that this view captures nothing of the reality of
subjective time as lived in experience.
There is a difference in conceiving time based on
measurement and time as real, concrete duration. Time is what is happening, and
more than that, it is what causes everything to happen. The measuring of time
never deals with duration as duration; what is counted is only a certain number
of extremities of intervals, or moments. However it is important to grasp the
real sense of time which is pure or concrete duration. This will help us to
place ourselves in becoming; letting ourselves live and refrain from separating
our present state from our former states. The ordinary conception of duration
depends on a gradual incursion of space into the domain of pure consciousness.
This is proved by the fact that, in order to deprive the ego of the faculty of
perceiving a homogeneous time, it is enough to take away from it this outer
circle of psychic states which it uses as a balance-wheel.[37]
Bergson says that we ought to learn
how to distinguish between duration as quality and time that has become
quantity as a result of being set out in space. Bergson tries to show that
homogeneous time is not the real sense of time, such notion of time belongs to
the notion of space. Duration is what one feels and lives.
Homogeneous time is abstract, it is what results when
we abstract from our experience and consider time intellectually. In time
conceived as homogeneous medium, our conscious states are ranged alongside one
another as in space, so as to form a discrete multiplicity. There is a
compulsion to borrow images from space to describe what the reflective
consciousness feels about time and succession; it then implies that pure
duration must be something different. Time conceived under the form of a
homogeneous medium, is a spurious concept, because the idea of space trespasses
the field of pure consciousness. Talking about homogeneous time, Bergson
concludes that what is homogeneous is space alone and that every discrete
multiplicity is gotten by a process of unfolding in space. He says that:
there is neither duration nor even
succession in space, if we give to these words the meaning in which
consciousness takes them: each of the so called successive states of the
external world exists alone; their multiplicity is real only for a
consciousness that can first retain them and then set them side by side by
externalizing them in relation to one another. If it retains them, it is
because these distinct states of the external world give rise to states of
consciousness which permeate one another, imperceptibly organize themselves
into a whole, and bind the past to the present by this very process of
connexion.[38]
Time in this sense is abstracted from duration. The
homogeneity of time implies a single position put alongside the same single
position and this is what Bergson calls pure space. Heterogeneity on the other
hand implies the multiplicity of conscious states permeated into one another
and Bergson refers to this as pure duration (concrete duration).
Concrete duration refers to real duration or concrete
time. It is the duration lived by consciousness, without it we will have no
idea of time. This is the real time; it can only be grasped by intuition, it is
the multiplicity which is successive and qualitative. We cannot abstract this
time, we can only experience it; time here is not considered as an abstract process
but is examined as part of real process. Concrete duration is the very stuff of
reality.[39]
However, as beings of consciousness we intersect real
duration and real space, Bergson writes:
There is a real space, without duration,
in which phenomena appear and disappear simultaneously with our states of
consciousness. There is a real duration, the heterogeneous moments of which
permeate one another; each moment, however, can be brought into relation with a
state of the external world which is contemporaneous with it, and can be
separated from the other moments in consequence of this very process. The
comparison of these two realities gives rise to a symbolical representation of
duration, derived from space. Duration thus assumes the illusory form of a homogeneous
medium, and the connecting link between these two terms, space and duration, is
simultaneity, which might be defined as the intersection of time and space.[40]
3.2.3 TIME IN RELATION TO
CONSCIOUSNESS
Consciousness is Bergson’s paradigm for duration.
Bergson extends the application of the notion of consciousness to point out the
similarity between different levels of duration. The major issue that emerges here is the link between
consciousness and time. Of what importance is consciousness to a proper
conception of time? Can duration or real time be considered without reference
or resort to consciousness? If we understand the essential nature of duration,
then we would see the necessary relation duration has to consciousness. If we
cannot take our states of consciousness into consideration, we cannot talk of a
conception of time but only of space. When our state of consciousness is taken
into consideration, then we can talk about real duration. This is to show that
there is only one real sense of time which is real duration (duree reelle), other senses are mistaken
attributes to the concept of time; they are illegitimate translations of the
un-extended into extended and of quality into quantity.
Consciousness does not admit of
measure. Thus, the time of consciousness does not occupy a unified homogeneous
medium but its different states, though successive, remain heterogeneous.
Bergson describes this as a qualitative multiplicity. Conscious states are
un-extended and non-juxtaposed.
La
duree (duration) connects our conscious states, it contains
within itself at every moment its whole past. Since consciousness contains
within itself the entire past, and every moment adds something new, no state of
consciousness can be repeated. Rather, in the act of recalling past conscious
states and bringing them to the present state, the self conceives time which is
real duration. In consciousness, time is conceived in succession without
distinction. Succession with recollection gives us the image of pure duration
which is considered as the process of our conscious states. We can apprehend
pure duration in which the conscious states flow, whenever we avoid
representing it in space.[41] The characters of pure duration converge on the
concept of the multiplicity of the conscious states. The multiplicity of
conscious states which is in pure duration cannot be counted without the
symbolization in space.
For Bergson, time belongs to consciousness and not to
the external world, it belongs only to the consciousness that retains its states
in their co-existence. He went further to validate this point by saying that
“there is no duration or succession in space”, their multiplicity is real only
for a consciousness that can first retain them and set them side by side by
externalizing them in relation to one another”.[42]
When Bergson asserts that duration belongs to consciousness, it does not imply
that consciousness alone exists, because this would amount to solipsism, rather
he reduced duration to consciousness; explaining becoming in terms of
consciousness alone. For Bergson, there is duration because there is
consciousness or states of consciousness. If there is no consciousness there
would be nothing but homogeneous time which is a spurious concept of time. Nevertheless, for consciousness, time continues to pass.
Now, for consciousness, the ‘active
synthesis’, to become aware of past and future, it must clearly access a
dimension that is more than the mere continuous differentiation accorded by the
first, passive synthesis of time.[43] The multiplicity of conscious states presents the idea
of pure duration. It seems that pure duration is defined by the concepts
concerning conscious states, but we should notice that pure duration cannot be
apprehended adequately by concepts.
Pure duration is what we go through in everyday life without the symbolization
rather than what we speculate or infer. It is not just the epistemological
object but life itself. This view is the foundation of Bergsonian philosophy.[44]
3.3 CONCLUSION
Time
as we live it is the true sense of time; it is heterogeneous, indivisible and
concrete. In our direct experience, we do not consider the scientific time, as
Bergson contended. What we consider is a flowing, irreversible succession of
phenomena which melt into one another to form an indivisible process. This
process is not homogeneous, but heterogeneous; it is concrete, but not abstract
and Bergson simply refers to it as real duration. This time is immediate,
active and on-going. An attempt to represent this time with a spatial image
would result to an abstract mathematical time, which Bergson considers to be a
fiction. However, Bergson asserted that the mistake of the mechanistic mode of
thought is to regard this fiction as a reality. Further in his conception of
time, Bergson relates the real time and its perception to consciousness.
Duration as experienced in consciousness is characterized by creativity,
heterogeneity, un-foreseeability, and freedom. From the outset of his theory of
time, Bergson established a radical distinction between homogeneous time and
concrete duration.
The
more we study time, the more we grasp the meaning of time ourselves, if
duration is the lived time as Bergson claimed, then it can be referred to as a
fundamental reality. The issue of the problem of time in philosophy is still
open to debate, this is because there has not been a consensus among
philosophers on what time is and what a proper conception of time should be.
Therefore, the next chapter analyzes Bergson’s notion of time trying to see its
lapses through the reactions of other philosophers to it.
CHAPTER FOUR
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BERGSON’S NOTION OF TIME
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In our
discussion so far, we exposed Bergson’s theory of time. Deliberations about
time raise a number of metaphysical considerations. This is evident in
Bergson’s notion of time. The structural order of Bergson’s notion of time is
intriguing; his distinction between inner state and outer state builds his
notion of time which is dualistic.
Time in
philosophy has long been a subject of debate, with several different
philosophers airing their individual opinions in theories. In this light,
Bergson has his submissions about time as a continuum; this is shown in his
theory of time as exposed in chapter three of this work. In this chapter we
will turn to an examination of the nature of the reactions and reception given
to Bergson’s notion of time by philosophers. However, the primary focus of this
chapter is to point out the implication of Bergson’s notion of time for
metaphysics.
4.2 THE STRANGENESS OF BERGSON’S IDEA
Time as proposed by Bergson is very
odd, so odd that anyone who thinks about it is apt to feel impelled to deny
outright that it even exists. This implies denying the standpoint on which
Bergson began his philosophy. One may need to find an alternative way of
expressing this idea of time as conceived by Bergson.
We must note that pure time is not only
an unobservable time, but it is compatible with and in fact entailed by
intuition and it is time as we live it. Bergson says that pure time is a time
conceived independent of space, and he goes further to say that it is not an
abstract concept but it is time as lived by consciousness. However, Bergson was
not careful enough to realize that even the consciousness that is living the
pure time is in space. The conception of pure time by Bergson has an a priori
character. It is odd to think of a time that is independent of space because
time as a continuum is a continuity in space. The self which lives the pure
time cannot be outside of space; the pure time of Bergson, when analyzed
clearly, will come back to space as concomitant with space.
4.3 REACTIONS
TO BERGSON’S NOTION OF TIME
Bergson
achieved enormous success in his philosophy, but there are equally divergent
interpretations of his ideas. There are agreements and disagreements to the
submissions of Bergson with regard to time. Some philosophers like Gilles
Deleuze have a positive reception of Bergson’s notion of time. On the contrary,
philosophers like Bertrand Russell, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and John McTaggart
among others are of a negative response to Bergson’s notion of time. All these
point to the fact that there is no consensus with regards to time as an issue
in philosophy. Hence, the problem of time is an open debate in philosophy.
Russell
criticized Bergson on his idea of continuity and discreetness. Having a strong
rejection and an attitude of disagreement to Bergson’s view on continuity
Russell argues:
Apart from the question of number, the chief
point at which Bergson touches mathematics is his rejection of what he calls
the cinematographic representation of the world. Mathematics conceives change,
even continuous change, as constituted by a series of states; Bergson, on the
contrary, contends that no series of states can represent what is continuous,
and that in change a thing is never in any state at all. … True change can only
be explained by true duration; it involves an interpenetration of past and
present, not a mathematical succession of static states. This is what is called
a dynamic instead of a static view of the world.[45]
Merleau-Ponty on the other hand
developed some fundamental Bergsonian insight on the nature of time. Unlike
Bergson, Merleau-Ponty has a neutral conception of time which is anti-dualism.
Merleau-Ponty criticized Bergson in his Phenomenology
of Perception and The Visible and the
Invisible. Merleau-Ponty summoned the position of Bergson in his Phenomenology of Perception.[46] He argues that a present situation can look like a previous
one in a thousand ways; every situation resembles an old one in one way or
another. This is a direct attack on Bergson’s view that although each moment
interpenetrates the next, it is qualitatively different from the last; it is
wholly new. Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea that the present is qualitatively
different from the past; he posits a present that is already transcendence,
distance; a present that can harbor the past, the imaginary, the dream, and the
phantasm.[47] Also, in The Visible and
the Invisible Merleau-Ponty criticizes Bergson by saying that it is
impossible to recall the past as it was; our present cannot coincide with the
being of the past.[48]
On the positive
side of the reactions to Bergson’s notion of time is Deleuze. Bergson is a
principle inspiration to Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze joins Bergson in the
critique of the clock time which they both regarded as no time. Deleuze conforms
so much to Bergson’s theory and to this extent, Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time is an impressive achievement, it is both an
interpretation of theories of time and an original contribution of Deleuze to
the problem of time. It presents time as an irreducible manifold of synthetic
process.[49] This stands as an antidote to reduce the philosophy of time to
the opposition of McTaggart’s A-Series versus B-Series, or tensed versus
un-tensed language.
4.3.1 BERGSON CONTRASTED TO
MCTAGGART
Bergson and
McTaggart are clearly opposed to each other. Bergson wrote his relevant work, Time and Freewill before McTaggart’s
famous 1908 article, “The unreality of Time”.[50] Basically, Bergson upholds the reality of time amidst his
reservations with regards to the theory of time but, McTaggart with his
“Series” arguments concludes that time is unreal. There is very little
substantive engagement between Bergsonian account of time and McTaggart’s
metaphysical concerns with what he called the A-Series and B-Series of time.
McTaggart’s “The Unreality of Time” which contains his submissions about the
problem of time, is influential upon the analytic tradition, but few accepted
his conclusion. McTaggart argues that positions in time are distinguished in
two fundamentally different ways. On one hand, time is dynamic; we see
positions either as past, present, or future. This dynamic conception is
associated with A-Series. On the other hand, we conceive time as being static
or tense-less, where each position in time is earlier than some and later than
some other position. This static conception is associated with B-Series.[51]
McTaggart
illuminated two possible ways in which positions in time can be ordered. His
A-Series of time is a representation of a psychological experience of
succession, which is a loss correspondence to what the phenomenologist calls
the natural attitude with regards to time, with certain events being futural,
coming to be present, and then moving into the past and the further past.[52]
A-series’ positions in time are ordered according to their possession of
properties like being two days future, being present, being one day past, and
so forth. The B-Series of time; the before, now and after, involves a
succession that maintains permanent relations among events, and suggests that
temporally tensed sentences are not required. The dynamic A-series offers
considerable problems that made McTaggart to conclude that time is unreal.
McTaggart claims that the notion of temporal becoming, bound up with the A-Series
of Past, present and future, leads to contradiction.[53]
Contrary to McTaggart, Bergson’s
philosophy of time is bound up with method of intuition and justification of
philosophical thoughts. Bergson advocates for the reality of time. He argues
that the real nature of time resides not in its segmented parts but in its
given experiential character as duration (duree):
the irreducible, purely qualitative, cumulative flow of a multiplicity of
states which forms an indivisible, heterogeneous continuum. However, debates
between the A-Series and the B-Series rest on the supposition that there is a
clear difference between A and B time. These two conceptions of time cannot be
distinguished by means of Bergsonian intuition. Bergsonian time is an
experiential time (lived time), unlike metaphysical issues that are less
connected to experience.[54] As
contrasted to McTaggart, Bergson’s philosophy of time can be compared with that
of other scholars like Heidegger.
4.3.2 BERGSON COMPARED WITH HEIDEGGER
There is much resemblance in the
philosophy of Bergson and Heidegger with regards to the problem of time as a
continuum. The philosophy of time in both Bergson and Heidegger is dualistic in
nature. Being dualistic, Bergson upholds and distinguishes between pure time and
alloyed time, while in the same light of dualism, Heidegger upholds that there
are authentic time and inauthentic time. However, there is no corresponding
relationship between their views in this regard; the pure time in Bergson’s
philosophy of time is the time understood by itself; it is a product of mental
synthesis. Heidegger’s authentic time is the primordial time. Like Bergson,
Heidegger is of the view that real time cannot be quantified. For example,
“half an hour is not thirty minutes but duration (Dauer) which has no ‘length’ at all in the sense of a quantitative
stretch”.[55] Bergson
and Heidegger, both distinguished the clock time from what they consider as the
‘real time’. Bergson distinguishes scientific time (clock time) from what he
calls duration (real time). The first is time as an intellectual, scientific
concept, and the second is time as we experience and live it.[56]
Heidegger with his own conception of time distinguishes between objective
quantitative time and subjective existential time. While objective quantitative
time is the clock time and it consists in irreversible passing moments,
existential time consists in the past, present and future, and is inseparable
as they constitute of human existence.
Bergson and Heidegger have much in
common in their views not disregarding the fact that they uphold fundamentally
different views on time; they both have something very important to say about
time as a continuum. For both Bergson and Heidegger, time is self-generic. The
‘Dasein’ of Heidegger corresponds to the self of Bergson. Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’
applies to anything that is ‘being-there’, Heidegger particularly applies the
‘Dasein’ to man.[57] The
structural whole of Heidegger’s authentic time is derived from Dasein whose
essence is ‘care’ and “care is that which forms the totality of Dasein’s
structural whole”.[58] Thus
for Bergson and Heidegger, the self is the source for time. Bergson and
Heidegger, from a metaphysical point of view expounded a theory of time with
references to the self. They both rejected the absolute notion of time which is
typical of the Newtonian theory.
In terms of the differences in their
detailed various expositions of time and its related concepts, Bergson’s pure
time is a mental synthesis of conscious states and alloyed time is an
artificial quantification of pure time. These are completely different from
Heidegger’s thought; Bergson’s pure and alloyed time has no similarity with
Heidegger’s authentic and inauthentic time. The duree (duration) of Bergson is a process of continuity while the
‘authentic time’ of Heidegger is finite. However, a fundamental point of
difference between Bergson and Heidegger is with regards to the future. The
future for Bergson is open, infinite and indefinite. Heidegger on the contrary
holds that the future is limited, finite and definite.
4.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF BERGSON’S NOTION OF
TIME FOR METSPHYSICS
Almost
everything about metaphysics is controversial. It is therefore not surprising
that there is agreement among those who call themselves metaphysicians.[59] On his
writing about Bergson on the metaphysics of time, Max Horkheimer says:
Since every metaphysics necessarily includes
the idea that its form and sense of events are not themselves again
subordinated to time, the intention of Bergson’s thought annuls its own
content. It denies time in that it elevates it to a metaphysical principle.[60]
Metaphysics has to do with the inner
essence of reality. To comprehend this essence, one cannot use representations
that are appropriate to space. Bergson’s philosophy of time
implicates his metaphysics. To validate Bergson’s metaphysics, one may have to
deny his theory of time. To this effect Max Horkheimer says:
By claiming
according to an analogy with the interior lived time of the individual, a so-called
spiritual interior of the world, that is, by making up a story about a divine
current of experience as absolute being, Bergson must also deny time. His long
outmoded pantheistic metaphysics contradicts his insight into the temporality
of reality and sublates it.[61]
The implication of Bergson’s notion of time
for metaphysics is seen in Bergson’s own conception of metaphysics. In his
conception, Bergson insists that metaphysics consists of intuition and not
analysis. Bergson in a letter written in 1915 speaks of
‘the intuition of duration’ as ‘the core’ of his doctrine on time which any
summary of his view must start from and constantly return to.[62] The major position of Bergson in his theory of
time is that real time is known by intuition. Bergson opposed Kant, and his own conception of
metaphysics is part of the opposition. Bergson holds that we can have insight
into how things are in themselves. He further asserts that it is the task of
metaphysics to pursue such insight.[63] This has a number of consequences;
The insights
achieved by intuition resist linguistic expression, linguistic expression
presupposing as it does the abstraction of analysis. So metaphysical insights
must likewise resist linguistic expression on this conception.[64]
The problem in Bergson’s philosophy arises
from a misunderstanding of language. The essential and inevitable nature of
language is such that what is given in intuition can never be adequately
expressed or communicated in language.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Bergson’s
philosophy of time attracted attention from different angles in the modern
world. Time basically for Bergson is pure duration. However, among the
attentions attracted by Bergson’s work are critical minds and rigorous readers
of Bergson’s work. Bergson’s work is received by different readers, especially
philosophers in different ways. As we see in this chapter, there are critics of
Bergson and there are equally those who give affirmation to Bergson’s work. To
this extent, Bergson’s work is compared, and contrasted with the positions of
particular philosophers.
Bergson’s
work has its credits and flaws. One of the credits of Bergson’s work is that he
was deliberate and decisive enough to showcase the inadequacy of the clock time
to suffice for time in the real sense of the concept as a continuum. On the
other hand one of the flaws of Bergson’s work on time is his extremity. Bergson
was too extreme when he accords independence to real time with regards to
space. For Bergson, the real time is independent of space, but he disregarded
the fact that the consciousness that live the real time, as he asserts, does
not exist in a vacuum, but is existing in space. With this, Bergson’s project
of separating real time from space is really not successful.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
As
proposed, this essay attempts a presentation of Bergson’s notion of time and
its implication for metaphysics. To this end, this essay started by showing the
general notion of time as it is commonly perceived. It went further to show
particular scholars’ (philosophers) views about time, then it presents
Bergson’s theory of duration which contains his notion of time, and finally it
shows reactions to Bergson’s notion of time, and its implication for
metaphysics.
In
philosophy time is one of the most difficult subjects because, notoriously, it
eludes rationalization. In an attempt to provide a proper conception of time,
philosophers have propounded different theories; each with the idea of what he
is convinced time is. However, Bergson succeeds in presenting time effectively
as reality that exists in its own right. Time in Bergson is almost accessible
and palpable in a discourse which overcomes certain difficulties of language
and traditional thought. Bergson equates time with duration, a genuine temporal
succession of phenomena defined by their position in that succession, and
asserts that time is a quality belonging to the nature of all things rather
than a relation between supposedly static elements. From what is presented in
this essay, one would readily remark that Bergson made one of the most
significant, though controversial, attempts to solve the problem of time as a
continuum by identifying and clarifying that the clock time does not suffice
for time in the real sense of the concept as a continuum.
The
aim of this essay is to make an exposition and analysis of the development of
Bergson’s conception of time and its implication for metaphysics. It deals
majorly on the basic thought of Bergson about what time really is, and his
distinction between the real time, which he calls duration and the scientific
time. From what is given in this work, we can readily affirm that Bergson’s
theory of time, his contribution to the problem of time attracted various
responses from different philosophers. The chief work of Bergson which is a
primary reference of this work is Essai
sur les donnees immediates de la conscience. This was written during the
years 1883 to 1887, and published in 1889. It was translated into English under
the title of Time and Free Will: An Essay
on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Here Bergson explains some of his
most fundamental concepts, which includes duration (La duree). Bergson’s theory of time is a discussion between real
time and scientific time. Real time is the actual flowing duration; while
scientific time represents the extrinsic measurement of the real time derived
from the movement of the sun, moon, and stars or by simply depending on the
dial and clocks. Following Bergson’s postulation we can see that the clock time
is more apparent than real. The Bergsonian conception of time implies that we
should put off all conventions of abstract time, and throw ourselves into
reality. We must feel the real concrete duration.[65]
Duration
is unlike our ordinary concept of time that is formed by the intellectual
faculty; Bergson describes the nature of the real time and shows how duration
differs from clock time. Measuring time is found to be merely counting
simultaneities. Duration as experienced in consciousness is characterized by
creativity, heterogeneity, un-foreseeability and freedom.
In
my opinion, the past is the only real part of time, it remains what it is no
matter the situation, but the present turns to past and the future turns to
present. However, the past can be brought back to consciousness momentarily.
The present is the most inconsistent part of time, it shifts between the
boundaries of past and future, but it is constantly being experienced.
However,
I agree with Bergson on his view that scientific time does not make a good
representation of time as a totality, but I disagree with him that time is
totally independent of space, because time itself is a continuum in space; any
being that experiences time must be in space.
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INTERNET MATERIAL
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/faculty/pearson/ansell-pearson_bergson_proofs.pdf Retrieved
December 26, 2015.
[1]
John A. I. Bewaji, An
Introduction to the Theory of knowledge: A Pluricultural Approach (Ibadan:
Hope publications, 2007), P. 11.
[2]
William F. Lawhead, The Voyage of
Discovery: A historical Introduction to Philosophy, second edition
(Belmont: Wadsworth and Thompson Learning, 2002), p. 484.
[3]
David. L. Sills (Ed). International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol.15. (New York: Macmillian Company
and the Free Press, 1972), p.25
[4]
John k. Ryan, Basic Principles and
Problems of Philosophy (Maryland, West Ministers: Newman Press, 1954), p. 54.
[5] Harvey R. Schiffman, Sensation and Perception: An Integrated
Approach, 5th edition,
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2000), p. 491
[6]
John Randolph Lucas, The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality and Truth, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989),
p.3.
[7]
Harvey R. Schiffman, Sensation and
Perception, p. 491.
[8]
Ibid. p. 492
[9]
Ibid. P. 492.
[11]
Quentin Smith and Nathan L. Oaklander. Time,
Change and Freedom: Introduction to Metaphysics. (London: Routledge Publications,
1995), p. viii.
[12]
William H. Bossart, Borges and
Philosophy: Self, Time and Metaphysics (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2003), p.87.
[13]
Lawrence Sklar, “Time” in Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, (London and New York: Routledge,
1998), p. 8622.
[14]
Jack Smart, “Time” in Paul Edwards (ed.), The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vols. 7 & 8, (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc. and The Free Press, 1967), p. 126.
[15]
William. H. Bossart, Borges and
Philosophy: Self, Time and Metaphysics, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.,
2003), p. 87.
[16]
Mortimer J. Adler (ed.), Timaeus, (Chicago:
The Great Books, Britannica Publications Ltd, 1993), p. 442.
[17]
Plato: The Timaeus, Transl. Benjamin Jowett, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970), p. 19.
[18]
Mortimer J. Adler (ed.), Timaeus, p,
444.
[19]
Aristotle: Physics: Transl. by
Edward. Hussey, (New York: Calderon Press, 2005), p. 43.
[20]
William Wallace, The Elements of
Philosophy: A Compendium for Philosophers and Theologians, (New York:
Society of St. Paul, 2010), p.54.
[21]
Scott MacDonald, and Norman Kretzmann, “Medieval Philosophy” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Version 1.0, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 5362.
[22]
Battista Mondin, A History of Medieval
Philosophy, (Rome: Pontifical Urbaniana University Press, 1991), pp.
102-103.
[23]
Bourke Vernon, “Thomas Aquinas” in Paul Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 7 & 8, p. 107
[24]
Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy,
(Charlottetown Canada: St. Dustan University, 1948), p. 360.
[25]
Thomas Sheehan “Heidegger, Martin (1889-1976)” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, (London and New
York: Routledge, 1998) p, 3409.
[26]
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, transl.
by John Mecquarrie and Edward Robinson, (London:
Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), p. 140.
[27]
Thomas Baldwin, “McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis (1866-1925)” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Version 1.0, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 5292.
[28]
John S. Mbiti, African Religion and
Philosophy, (London: Heinennman Educational Books Ltd, 1969), p. 17.
[29] Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Transl. Frank Lubecki Pogson, (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1950), p. 100.
[30]
Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, pp.
98-99
[31] Keith Ansell Pearson, “Bergson”, https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/faculty/pearson/ansell-pearson_bergson_proofs.pdf, (Retrieved December 26, 2015).
[32]
John J. C. Smart, “Time” in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vols. 7 & 8, (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and The Free Press, 1967), p. 127.
[33]
Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, p.
100.
[34]
Ibid.
[35]
Ibid, p. 125.
[36] John Alexander Gunn, Bergson and His Philosophy, (Liverpool: Blackmask, 2002), p. 29.
[37]
Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, p.
126.
[38]
Ibid, pp. 120-121.
[39]Henri
Bergson, Creative evolution, Transl.
Arthur Mitchell, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1998), p. 287.
[40]
Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, p.
110.
[41]
PARK
Dae Seung, “Two
Different Kinds of Multiplicity in Bergson: The Multiplicity of Conscious
States and the Muliplicity of Material Object”, in The 3rd BESETO Conference of Philosophy, Session 12, p, 302.
[42]
Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, pp.
120-121.
[43]
Matt Hodges, Rethinking
Time's Arrow: Bergson, Deleuze and the Anthropology of Time, (London: Sage Publications, 2008), p. 412.
[44] PARK
Dae Seung, “Two Different Kinds of Multiplicity in Bergson: The
Multiplicity of Conscious States and the Muliplicity of Material Object”, p,
303.
[45]Russell Bertrand, The
Philosophy of Bergson, (London: Macmillan and co., 1914), pp. 15-16.
[46]Judith Wambacq, “Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Criticism on
Bergson’s Theory of Time Seen Through the Work of Gilles Deleuze” in Elizabeth
Behnke, Dorion Cairns and Vittorio De Palma (eds), Studia Phaenomenologica: Concept of Tradition in Phenomenology, vol. xi, ( Bucharest: Humanitas, 2011),
p. 237.
[47]Ibid, p. 239.
[48]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invicible, Trans. Alphonso Lingis, (Evanston:
Northwestern University press, 1968), pp. 122-123.
[49]James Williams, Gilles
Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide, (Scotland:
Edinburgh University Press, 2011), p. 6.
[50] Alan Lacey, “Bergson, Henri-Louis” in Ted Honderich
(ed.), The Oxford Companion of
Philosophy, New Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2005), p.
88.
[51] Lars Lofgren, “Understandings of Time in
Complementaristic Language” in Patrick Baert (ed.), Time in Contemporary Intellectual Thought, (Holland: Elsevier,
2000), p. 46.
[52]
Jack Reynolds, “The Analytic/ Continental Divide: A Contretemps?” in Oppy
Graham and Nick Trakakis (eds), Antipodean
Philosopher: Public Lectures on Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, (Maryland:
Lexington Books, 2011), p. 241.
[53] Jonathan Lowe, “Time” in Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion of Philosophy, (New
York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2005), p. 877.
[54] Clifford Williams, “A Bergsonian Approach to A and B
time” in Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Philosophy,
(United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 379-393.
[55] Martin Heidegger, Being
and Time, transl. John Mecquarrie and Edward Robinson, (London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), p. 140.
[56] William F. Lawhead, The Voyage of Discovery: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy,
second edition, (Belmont: Wadsworth and Thompson Learning, 2002), p. 484
[57] Martin Heidegger, Being
and Time, p. 219.
[58] Ibid, p.
178.
[59] Williams H. Walsh, “Metaphysics Nature Of” in Paul
Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, vol. 5, (New York: Macmillian Publishing co., Inc. and The Free
Press, 1967), p. 300.
[60] Max Horkheimer, “On Bergson’s Metaphysics of Time”,
in David Cunningham, Howard Feather, Peter Hallward, Esther Leslie, Kevin
Magill, Stewart Martin, Mark Neocleous, Peter Osborne and Stella Stanford
(eds.), Radical Philosophy: A Journal of
Socialist and Feminist Philosophy, (Nottingham: Russell Press, 2005), p.
10.
[61] Ibid, p. 13
[62] Alan Lacey, “Bergson, Henri-Louis”, in Ted Honderich
(ed.), The Oxford Companion of
Philosophy, New edition, p. 88.
[63] Adrian W. Moore, The
Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making sense of things, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 422.
[64] Ibid
[65] Thomas Gerrard, Bergson: An Exposition and Criticism from
the Point of View of Thomas Aquinas, (London: Forgotten Books, 2014), p. 2.
