INTRODUCTION
The
concept of God is a subject of philosophical debate. Atheistic philosophers
deny the existence of God contrary to the positions of the theistic
philosophers who affirm God’s existence. The being of God transcends
physicality. However, Philosophers had
tried to provide suitable way to speak of God, since being transcendental; He is
beyond the qualification of our human language. However Thomas Aquinas tries to
provide an answer to this question in his Summa
Theologica when he talks about the metaphysics of predication and his
Negative and Positive theology. The focus of this paper is how we speak of God
in the context of Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics of predication and his Negative
and Positive theology.
AQUINAS ON HOW WE SPEAK ABOUT GOD
According
to Aquinas, God is the super-eminent darkness which transcends human knowledge.
Can we speak of God? Is it possible to qualify God with our human language? How
do we use our human language in reference to God? It is undeniably true that we
can speak about God. But Aquinas holds that we can never know positively what
God is.[1] However we can speak of
God in two ways: the negative and the Positive way. Aquinas sort to clarify the
questions of, “do we use words in reference to God as we used them in reference
to corporeal beings?” this lead to Aquinas’ metaphysics of predication.
AQUINAS’ METAPHYSICS OF PREDICATION
Words
according to Aquinas do not have the same meaning when we use them in reference
to God and man. Aquinas stipulated three predications, possible ways to use
words:
·
Univocal predication
·
Analogical predication
·
Equivocal predication
These
three predications differ in themselves. According to Aquinas, in univocal
predication, we speak of two things in exactly the same way with the same
meaning. In analogical predication we speak of two things with regards to their
similarities. In equivocal predication we speak of two things in completely
different ways. However, these predications come with language but Aquinas
rejected univocal and equivocal language, he sees them as improper references
to God. Univocal languages make God equal and same with human beings, which is
not the case. Equivocal languages make God totally different from human beings,
which is also not the case. Aquinas argues that if God is totally different
form us, then we cannot know anything about him.
In
his metaphysics of predication, Aquinas holds that the analogical predication
is the most proper to apply when we speak of God. This means that we speak of
God, making use of analogical language. In other words our language is similar
when we speak of God and when we speak of man. But our meanings differ with
regards to their degree of perfection.
Scholars
are hesitant to agree with Aquinas on his teaching concerning the definition of
theological language (the language we use to speak of God).[2] But it is maintained that
the analogical predication, in addition to the meaning a given name is properly
applied to both God and creatures, and it is specified that the reason for this
predication is the fact that creatures are produced by God.[3] Hence God created
corporeal beings with certain similarities with his own being.
Having
asserted that we can speak of God analogically, Aquinas says that we use
concrete nouns to refer to concrete things that are composite of matter and
form, and we use abstract nouns to speak about God. Aquinas argues that
recourse to the analogy of being is necessary, because for him, this does not
only express similarity on a dynamic level between God and his creatures but
also a similarity on the ontological level.
Aquinas
established two criteria for this analogy: distinction between simple and mixed
perfection and distinction in our words of the modus praedicandi and the res
predicata.[4]
For Aquinas, we arrive at a religious language from the experience of things in
this world. There are simple and mixed perfection in creatures. However, only
the absolute simple perfection can be directly and properly attributed to God;
they are applied eminently to God rather than creature. These include things
like goodness, wisdom, virtue etc. but mixed perfection is applied to God
metaphorically.
In
the second distinction, the res
praedicata is the perfection itself, while the modus praedicandi is the mode of realization it takes in creatures
or in God. Man perceives perfection through creatures, and he gathers
perfection according to the mode of realization proper to creatures. In other
words, we know this perfection based on their realization in us. So we cannot
perceive the absolute and totally perfect mode belonging to God.
“For
this reason, Aquinas concludes that if we wish to correctly use our language to
refer to God, then we must preserve only the res significata and
eliminate the modus significandi.
Human words never indicate the divine mode of the perfections we wish to say of
God. In this perspective, our words are always enfeebled.”[5] The eminent realization of
perfection in God surpasses our comprehension and expression.
AQUINAS’ NEGATIVE THEOLOGY
Aquinas’ negative theology stands in a long tradition,
reaching back to Hellenistic Judaism, Middle Platonism and many patristic
writers. Aquinas mitigates the starkness of the axiom
about God’s absolute unknowability and proposes a domesticated version of
Dionysian Negative theology and makes it compactible with the positive
theology. For Aquinas, God is indeed that super-eminent darkness which
transcends our knowledge and leaves us in ignorance.[6] We are ignorant of God
because God's infinite reality and perfection surpass and exceed every
conception of our intellect.
The ultimate human knowledge
of God occurs when someone “knows that he does not know God, inasmuch as he
realizes that what God is exceeds everything we understand about him.” Aquinas
in his negative theology synthesizes his view of God's incomprehensibility in
two theses: that no creature by its own natural powers can possess a
quidditative grasp of God's essence, which “remains totally unknown,” but at
best can know only that God
is and what God is not; and
that no creature can ever possess a comprehensive, infinite grasp of the divine
essence, even in the beatific vision.[7]
To have quidditive knowledge is to know essentially.
Aquinas’ negative theology
has three forms:
·
Qualitative negation: this is the kind of negation Aquinas has in mind
when he said although we cannot know what God is, we can know what he is not.
·
Objective modal negation: these are corrective
negative judgments applied to positive divine perfections.
·
Subjective modal negations: these deny that the
subjective, human way in which we understand positive divine perfections are to
be attributed to those perfections themselves.
For Aquinas, our knowledge
of God can grow as we add the negations one to another, and we approach closer
to the divine mystery by denying more and more imperfections of God and by
realizing ever more deeply that we cannot impute to God our finite and
creaturely modes of being and understanding.[8]
AQUINAS’
POSITIVE THEOLOGY
In his positive theology, Aquinas continually asserts that we can make true judgments about God’s
very nature and being, whether by reason or by faith. He argues that the
positive nature of predications like “God is good” cannot simply be reduced to
negative interpretations. Rather, he claims that such predications tell us
something true about God’s very nature.
CONCLUSION
Words
define ideas and ideas are applied to things. Since we can have an idea of God,
we can speak of him in words, although these words do not point to the essence
of God directly. We speak literally of God, but in an imperfect way, and we use
words in reference to God analogically with respect to his perfection. However,
our human language gives us an imperfect but complementary view of God’s
perfection.
Aquinas’ theological epistemology implies
that when we talk about God, the very meanings of the words we use are somehow
dependent upon what we hold to be true about God. Aquinas’ God-talk blends both
the positive and the negative, but the positive is foundational for the
negative, for God is the pure positivity of infinite Being who in creation has
also acted positively on our behalf.
REFERENCES
Joseph Omoregbe.
A simplified History of Western Philosophy,
volume one: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Lagos: Joja Educational
Research and Publishers, 2007.
Battista Mondin.
A History of Medieval Philosophy.
Bangalore: Theological Publications, 1991.
Gregory Rocca,
O.P. “Aquinas on God-Talk: Hovering Over the Abyss” in Theological Studies. India: Dominican School of Philosophy and
Theology, 1993.
[1] Joseph
Omoregbe, A simplified History of Western
Philosophy, volume one: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, (Lagos: Joja
Educational Research and Publishers, 2007), P. 142.
[2]
Battista Mondin, A History of Medieval Philosophy,
(Bangalore: Theological Publications, 1991), P. 335.
[3]
Ibid
[4]
Ibid, p. 337
[5] Ibid,
p. 338
[6]
Gregory Rocca, O.P, “Aquinas on God-Talk: Hovering Over the Abyss” in Theological Studies, (:Dominican School
of Philosophy and Theology, 1993), P. 4
[7]
Ibid, p. 6
[8]
Ibid, p. 8
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