MORAL DILEMMA

MORAL DILEMMA

The philosophical debate on moral dilemma is basically concerned with two major issues: the question with regards to what moral dilemma is, and the question regarding the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma. Some philosophers have expressed their doubts with regards to the possibility of having a genuine moral dilemma. These philosophers do not concern themselves with discrediting the testimony of actual agents; rather they challenge the suppositions that provide ground for a genuine moral dilemma.

All these are based on the philosopher’s belief about the implications of accepting the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma. They considers its (genuine moral dilemma) problematic for the intelligibility of our moral concepts and the coherency of our moral theories. Subscribing to the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma may lead to a conclusion that our moral concepts are not reasonable and incoherent.

It is apparent that the claim of a genuine moral dilemma conflicts with some of our foundational assumptions about morality. This is because of a situational possibility of one being faced with two competing and mutually exclusive courses of action, that are both morally obligatory, out of which he must at least violate one of them, the result will show that the moral theory of the individual is incoherent and practically useless. If this is the case, then moral theories would apparently be giving its agents incoherent advice that is unintelligible and inconsistent. If it is the case that following a seemingly plausible moral theory brings predicament, then the theories would hardly be regarded as a reliable.

The possibility of a genuine moral dilemma triggers questions with regards to if moral theory and morality plays the presupposed role they are believed to be playing, could it be coherent, meaningful practical, intelligible etc. The philosophical discussion of moral dilemma challenges us to revisit and scrutinize our beliefs regarding the contents of our moral concepts and the relationship among them, and reassess our beliefs about the structure and content of moral theories. This discussion has not really concerned itself with issues concerning agents confronted with moral dilemma. The question of what makes an apparent moral dilemma genuine and the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma are questions of academic interest.

Serious moral persons are interested in the issue of moral dilemma because of the practical and personal crisis the dilemma may cause, and equally because the questions approach methods and responses to moral dilemma are connected intimately with the sense of their own moral identities.

WHAT ARE GENUINE MORAL DILEMMAS?

**Referring to a situation as a moral dilemma in contrast with a purely practical problem is to emphasize that the choice confronting an agent is morally significant. People confronted with moral dilemma are cognizant of the fact that their difficulties include matters of moral concern. Agents’ objects reflections include matters regarding the scope and weight of obligations to promote the well-being of those likely to be affected by their actions; a correct interpretation of the involvements in treating others with respect and a question of the degree of the priority given to the obligation. **Calling it a dilemma in distinction to a perplexing possible problem, is to suggest that the interpretation of the situation confronting an agent with two mutually exclusive choices is correct. The agent is not incapable of making decision, or inept in practical reasoning. Nor is the agent’s perception distorted by unacknowledged reason-eclipsing emotions.

The agents’ confusion with regards to what to do cannot be understood adequately as a visible sort of epistemic limitation casting shadow over the undertakings of situated human beings. Although no one knows the consequences but the claim of the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma where agents are faced with insoluble conflicts between equally compelling and competing moral requirements, out of which he must at least violate or dissatisfy one, is not an acknowledgement that the epistemic limitations inherent in human condition can have a remarkable moral consequence.

To call it a genuine moral dilemma as opposed to clear dilemma for agents in specific circumstances is in a way suggesting that the dilemma is inevitable. Specifically it suggests that the beginning of the dilemma does not base in identifiable prior moral misconduct of the agent that is facing the dilemma. It is not unusual to see people facing moral dilemma after engaging themselves with morally problematic conducts. It is obvious that prior misconduct lays foundation for moral dilemma. One cannot meet two competing commitments he may have undertaken though each may be equally biding and a failure to honour any of them is catastrophic. In this case, since the moral dilemma arose as a result of a prior moral misconduct, it is not a genuine moral dilemma because its emergence is avoidable.

Many philosophers have concerned themselves with the discussion of a genuine moral dilemma and it has been most actively disputed. The truth of the claim with regards to a genuine moral dilemma appears to be posing a blatant threat to the understanding of ordinary moral concepts, the coherence of moral theories, and the practicability of morality itself. Agreeing with the possibility of a situation where it is obligatory to do x, yet admit that to do x is not right, it would be odd with the conditions of our use of ordinary moral concepts like rightness, wrongness and obligation. It equally challenges understanding of the link between rightness and wrongness with obligation, and our impressions about the logical relationship between them. If I act based on obligations, then I am right and I cannot be wrong at the same time. An obligation to do x and a conviction that doing x is wrong is a contradiction, incoherent and puzzling and it need an explanation. The claim of rightness while acting based on moral obligation, and a voluntary choice not to do x when I believe it is an obligation, is wrong. Both shows clearly our view of the logical relationship between the concept of obligation, rightness and wrongness and may look like unchallengeable truth about any adequate moral theory.

Similarly, this applies to the presumed links between my choice not to do something because of my belief in the wrongness of it, and my presumed non-guilt for not doing it. Though there are complications in the possibility of subtle differences in the conditions of blaming and agent and judging an action to be worthy of blame, it would be clearly troubling to suppose that there would be no special suspension of the mechanics of blame and condemnations when an agent does x convinced that both doing x and not doing x is wrong. If it is the case that the agent is confronted by two acts that are wrong, as it could be the case that the agent is faced with a genuine moral dilemma, then reconsideration is needed about our views of the logical connection between wrongfulness and blame.

It is suppose that one cannot be obliged to do something if he/she cannot do it. If we cannot avoid an action, it is thought that we cannot be accused to have acted wrongly. If this is the case, there is problem both on the practical and theoretical aspects and more confusion about the relationship between them. When can an agent faced with two competing options (x and not x) be said to have acted accordance to his/her moral theory? And what critical force can be tagged to the judgment that one acted wrongly in doing x when it is also the case if he/she does not do x? Acknowledging the existence of a genuine moral dilemma requires we abandon our view that “ought implies can” and its clear consequences.

Taking seriously the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma, we are then committed to reject many moral concepts of our regular use, or revising them: denying the presumed relations we hold between them. Philosophers have raised credible questions with regards to the intelligibility of the presumptions that underlie our assessment of moral responsibility, and the possibility of us having the ability of making a rationally persuasive determination of practical responsibility. Most of the factors that forms the basis of the context in which agents act are outside the agent’s control. Some are even as a matter of luck and are not proper objects for moral assessment. The place of luck affect the action pattern of the agent, and indirectly our judgment of the agent’s action, the degree of his/her responsibility for acting so, and a question as to whether in some significant sense, an agent’s virtue or vice remains unresolved. In such case, there is good reasoning to question our intuition about the link between responsibility and ability, expressed in the “ought implies can” doctrine, is defensible with a well-understood foundation. Certainly the admission of the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma is clearly incompatible with the doctrine that “ought implies can” cannot be taken as foundation to deny that there are genuine moral dilemma.

Philosophers who doubt the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma believe that the problems posed by the possibility of moral dilemmas are deeper that those that attempt to interpret the dictum that “ought implies can”. They believe the possibility of a moral dilemma inflicts havoc at essentials of moral theories. It allows the possibility of moral theories that are quite satisfactory, comprehensive, intelligible, and plausible for example can be incoherent, inconsistent and impracticable. If this is the case, then acknowledging the possibility of facing genuine moral dilemma if we yield to a particular moral theory must lead us to lose confidence in that moral theory as a source of our precepts of action, or as a foundation upon which our choices are justified as morally defensible. Whether this would criticize plausible and attractive moral theories on purely intellectual grounds, or render them irrelevant is purely an academic question. It bereft morally serious people the sort of guidance they seek and hope to find when they are faced with serious moral dilemma: our expected problems and we want people to take it with seriousness.

The argument of denying genuine moral dilemmas because of our failures is not what we should refer to as decisive, or especially as compelling. There are other reasons for questioning the soundness of our presuppositions about the logic and nature of moral concepts, the role of moral theories and the fact that genuine moral dilemmas can be encountered is not something that is fatal to moral theories. This may provide evidence that the theories have problems, but that is much a weaker and more contestable claim.

Though the concern of many philosophers is the truth and falsehood of the logical and metaphysical claims regarding the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas, we can consider few, if there are any moral dilemmas. Defending such claim does not require a wrestle with the complexities of the logical relations between concepts. Strategy of retrospective assessment might be used. This strategy involves an attempt to tender the disinterested assessments of an agent’s opinions and their values. Discussions on the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma are prioristic and unaffected by the details of any agents’ moral experiences and struggles. The strategy of retrospective assessment emphasizes the importance of sensitiveness to the subtle differences surrounding the emergence of a genuine moral dilemma. They are in the position to explain an agent’s belief that these circumstances constitute a genuine moral dilemma and how and why particular agent’s impressions were mistaken. Our recognition superior epistemic value of after-the-fact analyses gives the strategy of retrospective assessment its plausibility. From a retrospective vantage point, we see why an agent may have believed that there were two exclusive options available, and why he/she must are seen the options as equally problematic. It is recognizable that the agent in material terms is wrong; there were more than two options, and they are not equally problematic. When finally we embrace the strategy of retrospective assessment, reasonably we may hope to achieve greater appreciation of the context that brought about the agent’s dilemma arose. In many cases, it may involve us believing that         a comprehensible explanation of the beginning of the agent’s dilemma involves discovering that the agent’s prior misconducts facilitated the emergence of the dilemma. In this case, we are justified in saying that the agent is actually faced with dilemma which is as a result of his fault; the dilemma is not a genuine one.

Invoking the retrospective assessment strategy is familiar and intuitively plausible. It also is helping us to construct a deeper explanation of the human phenomena encompassed by moral dilemmas. We are equally reminded of the fact that humans are prey to vulnerabilities and distortions of judgment and perception, and it can result deep moral indecision, confusion and regret. Using retrospective assessment, we enhance an appreciation that the human perspective is flawed and limited. The limitations of an agents’ perspective explains why the dilemma seems insoluble to him/her, giving us basis to deny their insolubility. Mature agents adopt retrospective stance in assessing their deeds and confusions that face other agents. They are able to appreciate the limitations inherent in their stance as being finite, and acknowledge the importance of noticing that problems that appear insoluble actually may not be so.

Invoking retrospective assessment strategy in challenging accepted genuine moral dilemma, we may be seen as attempting giving substance to crucial matters. Individuals can face dilemmas that appear insoluble, and suffer great consequences, but this does not support the claim that there is indeed genuine moral dilemma. The inability to give solutions to what is taken as genuine moral dilemma does not make the dilemma genuine, just as my inability to solve a mathematical problem does not mean the problem have no solution. Appealing to the strategy of retrospective assessment leads to the conclusion that genuine moral dilemmas are rare than we suppose, but cannot justify that genuine moral dilemmas are impossible. We make use of the retrospective analyses in diagnosing perception, but this does not doubt the possibility that moral dilemma may have been genuine. No human is perfect, but this does not mean we cannot be classified as virtuous or vicious, right or wrong.

Appreciating the challenges to the existence of genuine moral dilemma seems to be missing from the discussion of moral dilemma, but it does not question the conditions of the possibility of us criticizing people’s moral choices. The agent’s appreciation of the need for action gives us the nature and significance of moral dilemmas. When we confront the question: are there genuine moral dilemmas? The question amounts to semantics: an agent’s situation can place him/her in a serious personal moral dilemma whether it is classified as a genuine moral dilemma or not.

APPLICATIONS

***Are there inevitable genuine moral dilemmas? There are basis for an affirmative answer. Focusing on agent’s deliberations and instances, there will be a lack of genuine moral dilemmas. We are frequently faced with insoluble dilemmas. Our speech is vague; all the moral questions do not present the agent with two opposing options, and not all are dilemmas. There should be resistance to the suggestions that issues like abortion, capital punishment and assisted suicide are reductive and presents an agent with one moral dilemma. Appealing to the experiences of mature human beings, we are inclined to conclude that there are genuine moral dilemmas. If our concern with moral dilemmas extends beyond their logical implications, then we should be interested in exploring specific examples, some details maybe altered and the name of the principle changed, but the incident is one that actually occurred.

People in great jeopardy may have faced genuine moral dilemmas. It is a genuine moral dilemma is not merely because it posed a difficult problem that was not clearly soluble. It may also be called genuine moral dilemma just to show that the agent’s decision must have been agonizingly difficult for him/her. The most striking feature of an agent’s situation, the one in the virtue of which it merits the description of a genuine moral dilemma, is the significance of making a decision in such a situation. In making a decision he forges a link of his/her moral identity. Genuine moral dilemmas present agents with situations in which their choices are horribly constricted. Acknowledging genuine moral dilemma is not to affirm that life is tragic or that morality fails in situations that present us with terrible or tragic choices.